[×CONFIDENTIAL×]
SOUTH-EAST ASIA
TRANSLATION AND
INTERROGATION CENTER
Psychological Warfare
INTERROGATION
BULLETIN No 2
[logo mark]
S.E.A.T.I.C .
【辭達而已矣】
Allender Swift. [Signature]
Colonel, Inf., U.S. Army,
Superintendent,
S.E.A.T.I.C.
[×CONFIDENTIAL×]
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
S.E.A.T.I.C. INTERROGATION BULLETIN No. 2
dated 30 November 1944.
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The information contained in this Bulletin is obtained by Interrogation. The reference numbers shown against each item denote the the informants. P.W. captured by American or Chinese Forces are indicated by the latter A/- or C/- respectively. The addition of (Preliminary) to the reference number indicates that the information has been extracted from a Preliminary (Operational) Interrogation Report.
A record of the original material on which this information is based is kept for reference. Any enquiries should state the number and paragraph, and should be sent direct to the Officer Commanding, C.S.D.I.C. (I), Red Fort, Delhi.
Although every effort is made to ensure accuracy, the information in this Bulletin should be treated with reserve until confirmed from other sources.
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LIST OF CONTENTS
Pars.
1. Effect of Allied Propaganda upon the Japanese Army in Burma.
2. “Do’s and Don’ts” in Propaganda to the Japanese, a P.W’s essay.
3. Detailed Criticism upon one issue of the “GUNJIN SHIMBUN” by a P.W.
4. The notorious Col. MARUYAMA.
5. Disregard of troop’s welfare by Japanese Officers.
6. Difficulties due to re-inforcements from different depots.
7. Average age of re-inforcements to Burma.
8. A Pacifist in the Japanese Army.
9. A Japanese Army Brothel in the forward area.
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1. EFFECT OF ALLIED PROPAGANDA UPON THE JAPANESE ARMY IN BURMA.
(COMMENT: P.W. Reports upon the effect of Allied propaganda are conflicting. They differ greatly according to P.W’s personality and own experiences. If he is of a non-susceptible type, with most of his service in a rear area, and has experienced but little Allied propaganda, he reports the effect as beeing practically nil. However, the resentment aroused by certain types of propaganda may indicate that some effect has been produced. If the P.W. has suffered considerable hardships prior to capture, and has been subjected to more extensive propaganda, much of it applicable to his own misfortunes, he reports the effect as being considerable. These considerations should be borne in mind in evaluating the following P.W. peport.)
(a) M.555, a Lt. of Ⅲ Bn., 55 Inf. Regt., was captured at Myitkyina on 19 July 1944.
(ⅰ) Prior to his capture M. 555 had read many of the leaflets dropped by Allied planes, and says that day after day planes came over dropping leaflets. He reports that for the most part these had very littie effect on the men’s morale. M.555 dose not in general consider these leaflets as being well produced, he thinks their composition is mediocre and the general subject matter not of a nature likely to appeal to the mind of the average Japanese O.R. (Ref. his essay below.)
M.555 had listened frequently to the Japanese broadcasts from Delhi, in fact it was a common practice amongst the officers of his unit. Listening to the Delhi was strictly forbidden, but they all did it secretly on the ordinary field W/T sets, either Type 3 or Type 5, as they had no private receiving sets of their own. The news as put out from Delhi was regarded as bring so much propaganda, and only half of it taken as being anywhere near the truth. M.555 said they always recognised the Delhi Broadcasts because of the announcer’s obviuosly foreign accent.
M.555 has listened to Forward Broadcasts , the last occasion being just before his capture at Myitkyina. He says that Forward Broadcasts have a strong effect on the morale of Japanese troops providing that those to whom the broadcasts are made are “up against it”.
(ⅱ) Essay written by M.555 whilst under Interrogation at C. S. D. I. C. (I) giving his iwn views upon Allied propaganda. (Translation; original retained at C. S. D. I. C. (l).).
“EFFECT OF ALLIED PROPAGANDA ON THE JAPANESE ARMY.
“During the five years of my army career I have been indoctrinated against enemy propaganda as a soldier, at the officers’ school and as an Officer. The object of this teaching is to prepare us against all types of enemy propaganda, so as to let nothing stand in the way, to to believe in the Army (Command), to perform our utmost for the Empire.
The principles above-mentioned are clearly stated in the manuals “General Instructions regarding the Confuct of Infantry in Battle” and “Combat regulation” and also in the Mandate on “Soldiers’ Morale”.
Therefore in order to make effective propaganda, articles against “BUSHIDO” should be avoided, since the Japanese Army is too well indoctrinated agsinst (such) propaganda and with the Army spirit. A carefull study if the (charcter of the) Japanese people as a whole should be made, and articles which deal with this should have a better effect when sent at the right moment, both in time and un situation.
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I will quote a few examples Allied propaganda used against us during the North Burma campaign since last January and their effect.
The statements I make represent my straight-forward opinion, and in no way am I holding anything back just because I am a P.W. and receiving good treatment from you.
In the Hukawng Valley one Bn. attacked an enemy pisition for two days without success, and we withdrew to regroup for another attack. On the night before we were to make this attack, we had just finished supper and were about to get some sleep when a plane flew overhead and dropped some propaganda leaflets. These leaflets told of the situation in the South East Pacific, and the troops were greatly surprised to get news of such a character, but the one thing which spoiled its effect was the last part which contained uncomplimentary remarks about the Emperor and the Imperial Household. Officers and men were very much hurt by these, although the article on the S. W. Pacific was very good and appreciated. It aroused great resentment and morale became very high. Consequently when we attacked the position again on the third day, we succeeded in capturing it.
So by just a few lines saying the wrong thing, propaganda intended to lower morale will instead back-fire on the Allies.
Propaganda concerning Surrender:
From ancient times there has been no instance where a Japanese soldier has voluntarily surrendered. (Edit. Comment: C. S. D. I. C. (I) have a number of instance to the contrary.) The reason for this is that throughout the whole of Japan the Japanese Spirit is pounded deeo into the heart of each and every Japanese from the time he or she is born, in other wors BUSHIDO. Also in the Imperial Rescript, Field Manuals, and other documents, it us specifically stated that it is grave dishonor and disgrace to become the P. W. To be captured and to give out military information is disgraceful, but it is an honor to commit suicide in order to “save one’s face”. So therefore in any circumstances anyone with the true Imperial spirit and ideal will never give himself up to be taken as a P.W.
On two or three occasions leaflets stating that if we would wave the leaflets above our heads and give ourselves up, the Allies would treat us well and no harm woul befall us. I was in hospital at the time one of these leaflets was dropped; a soldier brought one in and we all had big laugh over it. Since in the Japanese Army there is a great shortage of paper we make use of them in more ways in one.
From your point of view it is just a waste of money and paper to drop such propaganda. The leaflets are sent back to our Intelligence Department so as to gather information on the Allies. The Intelligence people check the quality of the paper, ink, and the type of literature, etc., and can get some knowledge of your economic situation. And if the leaflets were not carefully prepared, they may give the Japanese much needed information.
Burma night and Short Scripts.
In one of the propaganda leaflets there was a sentry stating with the jungle night as a background. When we got one of these, we had finished supper and were going to sleep. After looking at the picture it brought back forgotten memories of home and thoughts within ourselves that we may never get to return home. To thise who had wives and children, it brings thoughts of tgem, and to others, it recalls many memories to their minds. No matter who he may be, thoughts of wife, children and parents, especially to one who cannot go home, will arise.
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On the other half of the leaflets was a short script on home-front conditions, and the conversation at of people at home, and thoughts of wives, children parents after going to bed. Here out in the front lines we get no letters for long periods of time, no news from home, no radio news or newspapers.
So in my opinion if such things could be considered and utilized, it would carry a great effect.
In the Signals men set up receiving sets in the trenches and listen to news. Mainly they listen to news broadcast from Delhi. They are incredurous of the war news, but music and drama have a great sentimental. One of the broadcasts dealt with the anti-war sentiments of the noted Japanese statesman NAGANO Seigo. I think that broadcasting views of leading statesmen who are against the war will have a great effect.
The most ideal time is to send over your propaganda is when a situation arises of shortage of amunition, arms and rations. It is important to choose the and to send the right type of propaganda.
In my opinion the effect of Allied propaganda in North Burma up to now has been only 5%.
(b) M.493, a Sjt. Maj. of H. Q. 114 Inf. Rgmt., was captured at Myitkyina on 7 Aug 1944.
M.493 reports that while at Myitkyina in June 1944 he saw some dozen different leaflets which had been dropped at various times. In his opinion the effect of these upon morale of the men was considerable and made them very despondent. Many would have liked to surrender, but did not get the chance as they were closely watched by their officers. The officers ordered all leaflets to be handed in or destroyed.
M.493 had not seen the GUNJIN SHIMBUN prior to capture, but has read it since. He is of the opinion that this publication dropped in rear area would have more effect on morale than when dropped in the forward areas, as troops in the rear have more time to read and digest its contents.
In June 1944 while at Myitkyina he saw and read one copy of the “Battlefront News”. This he considered was very effective on account of its brevity; and he is of opinion that the troops for the most part believed the news it contained.
M.493 listened to forward Broadcasts when at Myitkyina; they were from a distance of 500 yds. He considers they had an undermining effect upon Japanese morale, and gave his opinion that the Japanese songs made the men feel home-sick and despondent and the subsequent adress urging them to surrender had a great effect.
(c) M.170, a L/Cpl of Sigs Unit, Ⅱ Bn. 214 Inf. Rgmt., csptured at Bishenpur in May 1944, gives a completely opposite report to M.493 (para. b.)
M.170 had seen and read leaflets dropped in the Imphal area in May 1944. These were treated as a joke, as the men considered them to be merely lying propaganda. At that time the morale of the men were in his Rgmt. was high, and they paid no attention to the subject matter, merely using the paper for making cigarettes and for other purposes.
M.170 had listened to Forward Broadcasts about the same time. He reports that the men enjoyed the music and the songs, but were quite unaffected by the subsequent talk urging them to surrender.
(d) M.309 a L/Cpl of Ⅲ Bty. 21 Fd. Arty. Rgmt., captured in the Sangshak area in July 1944, gives a similar report.
M.309 had seen leaflets dropped in the Imphal area during June-July 1944. At that time he says the morale of 21 Fd. Arty. Rgmt. was high and the troops paid no attention to them whatsoever.
He had also listened to Forward Broadcasts about the same time, and reports that apart from the songs, which the men enjoyed, the broadcasts had no effect.
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9. A JAPANESE ARMY BROTHEL IN THE FORWARD AREA.
９．前線地域の日本軍娼館
Note: The following is derived from interrogation at C.S.D.I.C.(I) of M. 739, and from O.W.I. Interrogation at Ledo Base Stockade of 20 Korean “comfort girls”, Report dated 21 Sept. 1944.
注記：以下は合同詳細尋問センター·インド支局における M.739 の尋問と、1944 年 9 月 21 日付、レド基地の収容所における戦争情報局による 20 人の「慰安婦」の尋問の報告書から得られたものである。
Source: M.739, a civilian brothel-owner, captured with his wife and 20 Army prostitutes near WAINGMAW on 10 August 1944.
情報源：1944 年 8 月 10 日、妻および 20 人の陸軍売春婦とともに捕らえられた軍属の娼館主、M. 739。
M.739, his wife and sister-in-law had made some money as restaurant keepers in KEIJO, KOREA, but their trade declining, they looked for an opportunity to make more money and applied to Army H.Q. in KEIJO for permission to take ‘comfort girls’ from KOREA to BURMA. According to P.W. the suggestion originated from Army H.Q. and was passed to a number of similer Japanese “business men” in KOREA.
M.739 と、その妻および義姉/妹は朝鮮の京城で料理店の主人としてなにがしかの金を稼いでいたが、商売が傾いたため、もっと金の稼げる機会を探して、朝鮮からビルマに ｢慰安婦｣ を連れて行く許可を京城の軍司令部に申請した。戦争捕虜によると、その誘いかけは陸軍司令部から発し、朝鮮における幾多の同種の日本人 ｢業者｣ に伝えられていた。
M.739 purchased 22 Korean girls, paying their families from ¥ 300 to ¥ 1000 according to the personarity, looks and age of the girl. These 22 girls were of the ages from 19 − 31. They became the sole prorerty of P. W. and the Army made no profits from them. H.Q. Korea Army gave him a letter adressed to all military H.Q. of the Japanese Army, requesting them to furnish any assistance he might require, transport, rations, meddical attention, etc.
性格や容姿、年齢に応じて 300 円から 1,000 円を家に支払い、M.739 は 22 人の朝鮮娘を買い入れた。これら 22 人の娘の年齢は 19 歳から 31 歳だった。娘らは戦争捕虜だけの所有物となり、陸軍は娘らから利益を引き出さなかった。朝鮮軍司令部は日本陸軍のすべての軍司令部にあてた書状を彼に与え、その書状は輸送、糧秣、医療的配慮など、彼が必要とするであろうあらゆる援助の提供を要請していた。
Leaving his sister-in-law to carrry on the restaurant, M.739 and his wife, with their 22 girls, embarked at FUZAN on 10 July 1942 in a group of 703 girls, all Korean, and some 90 Japanese men and women, all of them of the same base sort as himself. They sailed on a 4000 ton passenger ship in a convoy of seven ships. Free passage tickets were provided by Army H. Q., but P.W. paied for all meals during the voyage. They called at FORMOSA, where 22 other girls bound for SINGAPORE were taken on board, and at SINGAPORE they transferrrd to another ship, arriving at RANGOON on 20 August 1942.
料理店を続けるために義姉/妹を残し、M.739 とその妻は 22 人の娘らを連れ、みな朝鮮人の 703 人の娘たち、およびみな彼と同じ卑しい素性の 90 名ほどの日本人男女からなる一団に加わって、1942 年 7 月10 日に釜山から出航した。4,000 トンの客船七隻からなる護送船団による航海だった。無料の乗船切符を陸軍司令部が用意してくれたが、航海中の食事代はすべて戦争捕虜が支払った。船が台湾に立ち寄ると、シンガポール行きの別の 22 人の娘たちが乗せられ、一行はシンガポールで他の船に乗り換えて1942 年 8 月 20 日、ラングーンに到着した。
At RANGOON they were divided into groups of 20 to 30 girls in each and disperced to various parts to BURMA, each group being attached to various regiments, units or formations, so that each had its own brothel(s).
ラングーンで一行は 20 人から 30 人ずつの集団に分かれ、ビルマの様々な地方に散って行った。それぞれのグループが様々な連隊や部隊、編隊に付属したから、各隊が固有の娼館 (一つまたは複数) を持つことができた。
M.739’s group was attached to 114 Inf. Regt. They spent some month at GOUNGOO, MEIKTILA, and at MAYMYO, following their trade, and then arrived at MYITKYINA (about January 1943). There are already two brothels established in MYITKYINA, so altogether there were three brothels with 63 girls in all: M.739’s house, known as KYOEY with 22 Korean girls; the KINSUI house, with 20 Korean girls; and the MOMOYA house with 21 Chinese girls, who had been purchased from CANTON on the same conditions as the Korians. There were Japanese girls in houses in the rear areas, as for example at MAYMYO where they formed two of the eight houses there,but none in the forward areas.
M.739 の集団は第 114 歩兵連隊に配属された。ゴウングーとメイクティラ、メイミョーで商売に従事しながら数ヶ月を過ごし、その後（1943 年 1 月ごろ）ミッチーナーにやって来た。ミッチーナーにはすでに二つの娼館が設置されていたから、合わせて三軒の娼館が総計 63 人の娘を抱えることになった。キョウエイという名の 22 人の朝鮮娘がいる M.739 の娼館、20 人の朝鮮娘がいるキンスイという娼館、そして朝鮮娘と同じ条件で広東から買われて来た 21 人の中国娘がいるモモヤという娼館がそれである。後方地域の娼館には日本の女もいて、例えばメイミョーでは八軒のうち二軒の娼館が日本人を置いていたが、前線地域にはいなかった。
Every ‘comfort girl’ was employed on the following contract conditions. She received 50% of her own gross takings and was provided with free passage, free food and free medical treatment. The passage and medical treatment were provided by the Army authorities, the food was purchased by the brothel owner with the assistance of the Army supply depots. The owners made other profits by selling clothing, necessities and luxuries to the girls at exorbitant charges. When a girl is able to repay the sum of money paid to her family, plus interest, she should be provided with a free return passage to KOREA, and then considered free. But owing to war conditions, no one of M.739’s group had so far been allowed to leave; although in June 1943, 15 Army H.Q. had arranged to return home those girls who were free from debt, and one girl who fulfilled these conditions and wished to return was easily persuaded to remain.
どの ｢慰安婦｣ も以下の契約条件で雇われていた。「慰安婦」は自分の売上総額の 50% を受け取り、無料の交通と無料の食糧、無料の医療処置を提供された。交通と医療処置は陸軍当局が提供し、食料は陸軍兵站部の支援により娼館主が購入した。抱え主たちは衣服や必需品、贅沢品をとんでもない料金で娘たちに売りつけることにより、別途に利益を得ていた。娘が家に支払われた金の総額と利子を弁済できたときは、朝鮮までの無料の帰還の旅を提供された上で自由と見なされるはずだった。だが戦況のせいで、M.739 の集団のなかで去ることを許された者は今のところなかった。もっとも 1943 年 6 月に第 15 軍司令部が負債のなくなった娘を帰郷させる措置を取ったことはあったが、この条件を充たして帰郷を望んだ一人の娘は、容易に説得され残留した。
In M.739’s house the maximum gross takings of a girl were around ¥ 1500 per month, minimum around ¥ 300 per month, or by rule of the house, the girl had to pay to the brothel owner a minimum of ¥ 150 per month.
M.739 の娼館では娘一人の売上総額は最高で月に 1,500 円、最低で月に 300 円だった。そうでなくとも娼館の決まりで、娘は娼館主に月に最低 150 円を支払わなければならなかった。
The scale of charges and time-table was fixed by instructions from the Regt. , the time-table being so contrived that officers, noncomissioned officers and men would would not meet each other at the same time. The schedule was strictly adhered to; and noncommissioned officers and men were supposed to visit the brothel only once weekly, officers as offen as they wished. Payment was made on a ticket, which was of cardboard about two inches square, bearing the name of the house, the Regimental seal, and the price of the ticket. In M.739’s house the schedule was originally laid down as follows:
Soldiers. 1000 hrs. − 1500 hrs., charge ¥ 1.50
N. C. Os. 1500 hrs. − 1700 hrs., charge ¥ 3
Officers, 2100 hrs. − 2359 hrs., charge ¥ 5
Officers, 2359 hrs. − morning, charge ¥ 20
連隊からの指示で料金表と時間割が決められ、時間割は将校と下士官、兵卒が同じ時間帯に顔を合わせないように工夫されていた。予定表は厳守され、下士官と兵卒は週に一度だけ、将校は何度でも望むだけ、娼館を訪れるものと考えられた。支払いは切符制で、切符は約２インチ[５cm]四方の厚紙に娼館の名前と連隊の印章、切符の価格を記載したものだった。M.739 の娼館では当初、予定表は以下のように定められた。
兵卒 10 時～ 15 時 料金 1 円 50 銭
下士官 15 時～ 17 時 料金 3 円
将校 21 時～ 23 時 59 分 料金 5 円
将校 23 時 59 分～翌朝 料金 20 円
But on orders of Col. MARUYAMA (ref. para 4), the charges were later reduced as folllows, the time table remaining as before.
Soldiers ¥ 1.50
Noncommissioned officers ¥ 2
Officers ¥ 5
Officers midnight−morning ¥ 10
だが丸山大佐の命令で料金は後に以下のように引き下げられた。時間割はそのまま。
兵卒 1 円 50 銭
下士官 2 円
将校 5 円
将校 (夜半から翌朝) 10 円
The house was controlled by 114 Inf. Regt. Capt. NAGASUE of Regt. H.Q. being the liaison officer in charge. Usually two men of Regt. H.Q. detailed to the house for the purpose of identification of those frequenting the brothel, although men of other Regts. were permitted to visit the brothel if they happened to be in a party of 114 Infantry Reginent men. A military policeman was also on patrol duty at the house. The daily attendance at M.739’s house was 80 to 90 noncommissioned officers and men and 10 to 15 officers.
娼館は第 114 歩兵連隊の統制下に置かれ、連隊司令部のナガスエ大尉が連絡将校として担任していた。通常は連隊司令部付きの二人の兵が娼館に派遣された。娼館に足繁く通う客の身元確認がその目的だった。ただし第 114 歩兵連隊の兵士と共同行動することになったときには、他の連隊の兵士も娼館に訪れることを許可された。憲兵もまた娼館を巡視していた。M.739 の娼館の毎日の入場者は下士官と兵卒が 80 人から 90 人、将校が 10 人から 15 人だった。
In the brothels, liquors (local variety) were sold freely to the men, but the military police personnel took care that there was no excessive drunkenness or quarrels. If in spite of this control a man drank too much, the military policeman usuall y took him out of the house. Occasionally quarrels also broke out and were similarly suppressed.
娼館では酒類 (地方により異なる) が自由に売られていたが、要員の憲兵は過度の酩酊や喧嘩がないように注意していた。この監督にもかかわらず飲みすぎた兵士がいると、憲兵が娼館の外に連れ出した。時には喧嘩が発生することもあったが、同様にして抑えられた。
In MAYMYO similar regulasions were in force, but owing to the large number of units stationed there, some of the houses had definite scheduled days for specific units. For example, a house of Japanese girls the DAI ICHI FURUSA, had the following schedule:―
Sunday:― 18 Div. H. Q. Staff,
Monday:― 18 Div. Cavalry Regt.,
Tuesday:― 18 Engineer Regt.,
Wednesday:― day-time medical inspection then free, evenings, officers only,
Thursday:― 18 Div. Medical Unit,
Fryday:― 18 Mtn. Arty. Regt,
Saturday:― 18 Div. Transport Regt.
メイミョーでも同じ様な規則が施行されていたが、数多くの部隊が駐屯するため、個々のの部隊に特定の曜日を割当てて予定を組む娼館もあった。例えば日本の女のいる娼館、第一フルサは以下の予定を組んでいた。
日曜日 第 18 師団 司令部職員
月曜日 第 18 師団 騎兵連隊
火曜日 第 18 工兵連隊
水曜日 昼間は医療検査の後、自由時間。夜間は将校専用
木曜日 第 18 師団 衛生隊
金曜日 第 18 山砲兵連隊
土曜日 第 18 師団 輸送連隊
Another brothel, the SUIKO EN, was reserved for officers only.
もう一つの娼館、スイコウエンは将校専用となっていた。
There was a strict order for the use of contraceptives; so that according to M.739, cases of venerael disaeases were due to the carelessness of the soldiers themselves. During the 1 1/2 years M.739 was running the house of MYITKYINA, there ware only six cases of V.D., who were sent to the Medical Officer of 2 Fd. Hospital 18 Div. for treatment. There were some cases of V.D. amomg the soldiers of 114 Inf. Regt., but M.739 never had any trouble with Regt. H.Q.
On 31 July, about midnight a party of 63 girls from the three brothels in MYITKYINA, and the brothel owners etc., began their evacuation from MYITKYINA. The girls wore dark green Army clothing on top of their civilian clothes. They crossed the IRRAWADDY in ten small boats. The majority of the remaining troops had already departed from MYITKYINA, but the sick and wounded were left behind. The girls remarked on this point ‘It was no use to get them across, because once across those soldiers couldn’t walk. It was better to float them down the river with the hope that they might get through.’ They landed north of Waingmaw where they remained in the Jungle until 4 August. The party then began to treck in the wake of the retreating troops. On 7 August, they became involved in a skirmish and in the confusion the party split up.
7 月 31 日の夜半ごろ、ミッチーナーの三つの娼館にいた 63 人の娘たちと娼館主たちその他の一行が、ミッチーナーからの撤退を始めた。娘たちは暗緑色の軍服を平服の上に重ね着していた。10 艘の小舟でイラワジ河を渡った。生き残った兵隊の大部分は既にミッチーナーを離れたが、傷病兵が取り残されていた。この点については、｢あの軍人たちは渡ったところで歩けやしないのだから、渡してもしようがない。どうにか切り抜けてくれることを願って、河に浮かべて流した方がいい｣ というのが娘たちの見解だった。彼らはワインマウ北方に上陸し、ジャングルのなかに 8 月 4 日まで留まった。その後、一行は退却軍の跡を辿り始めた。8 月 7 日に小戦闘に巻き込まれ、混乱のなかで一行は分裂した。
https://acrobat.adobe.com/id/urn:aaid:sc:AP:43aa69cc-af74-4aa8-a72f-8a700fd0118f
