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【工事中】東南アジア翻訳·尋問センター 心理戦 尋問公報第二号 1944. 11. 15

 

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   [×CONFIDENTIAL×]

SOUTH-EAST  ASIA
TRANSLATION  AND
INTERROGATION  CENTER

   Psychological  Warfare

   INTERROGATION
   BULLETIN  No 2

    [logo mark]
     S. E. A. T. I. C .

【辭達而已矣】 

           Allender Swift. [Signature]
           Colonel, Inf., U.S. Army,
           Superintendent,
           S. E. A. T. I. C.

   [×CONFIDENTIAL×]

 

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PSYCHOLOGICAL  WARFARE
S. E. A. T. I. C.  INTERROGATION  BULLETIN  No. 2
dated  30  November  1944.

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  The information contained in this Bulletin is obtained by Interrogation.  The reference numbers shown against each item denote the the informants.  P.W. captured by American or Chinese Forces are indicated by the latter A/- or C/- respectively.  The addition of (Preliminary) to the reference number indicates that the information has been extracted from a Preliminary (Operational) Interrogation Report.

  A record of the original material on which this information is based is kept for reference.  Any enquiries should state the number and paragraph, and should be sent direct to the Officer Commanding, C. S. D. I. C. (I), Red Fort, Delhi.

  Although every effort is made to ensure accuracy, the information in this Bulletin should be treated with reserve until confirmed from other sources.
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       LIST  OF  CONTENTS
Pars.
   1. Effect of Allied Propaganda upon the Japanese Army in Burma.

   2. “Do’s and Don’ts” in Propaganda to the Japanese, a P.W’s essay.

   3. Detailed Criticism upon one issue of the “GUNJIN SHIMBUN” by a P.W.

   4. The notorious Col. MARUYAMA.

   5. Disregard of troop’s welfare by Japanese Officers.

   6. Difficulties due to re-inforcements from different depots.

   7. Average age of re-inforcements to Burma.

   8. A Pacifist in the Japanese Army.

   9. A Japanese Army Brothel in the forward area.

 

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1.  EFFECT  OF  ALLIED  PROPAGANDA  UPON  THE  JAPANESE  ARMY  IN  BURMA.

(COMMENT: P.W. Reports upon the effect of Allied propaganda are conflicting.  They differ greatly according to P.W’s personality and own experiences.  If he is of a non-susceptible type, with most of his service in a rear area, and has experienced but little Allied propaganda, he reports the effect as beeing practically nil.  However, the resentment aroused by certain types of propaganda may indicate that some effect has been produced.  If the P.W. has suffered considerable hardships prior to capture, and has been subjected to more extensive propaganda, much of it applicable to his own misfortunes, he reports the effect as being considerable.  These considerations should be borne in mind in evaluating the following P.W. peport.)

  (a) M.555, a Lt. of Ⅲ Bn., 55 Inf. Regt., was captured at Myitkyina on 19 July 1944.

    (ⅰ) Prior to his capture M.555 had read many of the leaflets dropped by Allied planes, and says that day after day planes came over dropping leaflets.  He reports that for the most part these had very littie effect on the men’s morale.  M.555 dose not in general consider these leaflets as being well produced, he thinks their composition is mediocre and the general subject matter not of a nature likely to appeal to the mind of the average Japanese O.R. (Ref. his essay below.)

    M.555 had listened frequently to the Japanese broadcasts from Delhi, in fact it was a common practice amongst the officers of his unit.  Listening to the Delhi was strictly forbidden, but they all did it secretly on the ordinary field W/T sets, either Type 3 or Type 5, as they had no private receiving sets of their own.  The news as put out from Delhi was regarded as bring so much propaganda, and only half of it taken as being anywhere near the truth.  M.555 said they always recognised the Delhi Broadcasts because of the announcer’s obviuosly foreign accent.

    M.555 has listened to Forward Broadcasts , the last occasion being just before his capture at Myitkyina.  He says that Forward Broadcasts have a strong effect on the morale of Japanese troops providing that those to whom the broadcasts are made are “up against it”.

    (ⅱ)  Essay written by M.555 whilst under Interrogation at C. S. D. I. C. (I) giving his iwn views upon Allied propaganda.  (Translation; original retained at C. S. D. I. C. (l).).

  “EFFECT  OF  ALLIED  PROPAGANDA  ON  THE  JAPANESE  ARMY.

  “During the five years of my army career I have been indoctrinated against enemy propaganda as a soldier, at the officers’ school and as an Officer.  The object of this teaching is to prepare us against all types of enemy  propaganda, so as to let nothing stand in the way, to to believe in the Army (Command), to perform our utmost for the Empire.

  The principles above-mentioned are clearly stated in the manuals “General Instructions regarding the Confuct of Infantry in Battle” and “Combat regulation” and also in the Mandate on “Soldiers’ Morale”.

  Therefore in order to make effective propaganda, articles against “BUSHIDO” should be avoided, since the Japanese Army is too well indoctrinated agsinst (such) propaganda and with the Army spirit.  A carefull study if the (charcter of the) Japanese people as a whole should be made, and articles which deal with this should have a better effect when sent at the right moment, both in time and un situation.

 

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  I will quote a few examples Allied propaganda used against us during the North Burma campaign since last January and their effect.

  The statements I make represent my straight-forward opinion, and in no way am I holding anything back just because I am a P.W. and receiving good treatment from you.

  In the Hukawng Valley one Bn. attacked an enemy pisition for two days without success, and we withdrew to regroup for another attack.  On the night before we were to make this attack, we had just finished supper and were about to get some sleep when a plane flew overhead and dropped some propaganda leaflets.  These leaflets told of the situation in the South East Pacific, and the troops were greatly surprised to get news of such a character, but the one thing which spoiled its effect was the last part which contained uncomplimentary remarks about the Emperor and the Imperial Household.  Officers and men were very much hurt by these, although the article on the S.W.Pacific was very good and appreciated.  It aroused great resentment and morale became very high.  Consequently when we attacked the position again on the third day, we succeeded in capturing it.

  So by just a few lines saying the wrong thing, propaganda intended to lower morale will instead back-fire on the Allies.

Propaganda concerning Surrender:

  From ancient times there has been no instance where a Japanese soldier has voluntarily surrendered.  (Edit. Comment: C. S. D. I. C. (I) have a number of instance to the contrary.)  The reason for this is that throughout the whole of Japan the Japanese Spirit is pounded deeo into the heart of each and every Japanese from the time he or she is born, in other wors BUSHIDO.  Also in the Imperial Rescript, Field Manuals, and other documents, it us specifically stated that it is grave dishonor and disgrace to become the P.W.  To be captured and to give out military information is disgraceful, but it is an honor to commit suicide in order to “save one’s face”.  So therefore in any circumstances anyone with the true Imperial spirit and ideal will never give himself up to be taken as a P.W.

  On two or three occasions leaflets stating that if we would wave the leaflets above our heads and give ourselves up, the Allies would treat us well and no harm woul befall us.  I was in hospital at the time one of these leaflets was dropped; a soldier brought one in and we all had big laugh over it.  Since in the Japanese Army there is a great shortage of paper we make use of them in more ways in one.

  From your point of view it is just a waste of money and paper to drop such propaganda.  The leaflets are sent back to our Intelligence Department so as to gather information on the Allies.  The Intelligence people check the quality of the paper, ink, and the type of literature, etc., and can get some knowledge of your economic situation.  And if the leaflets were not carefully prepared, they may give the Japanese much needed information.

Burma night and Short Scripts.

  In one of the propaganda leaflets there was a sentry stating with the jungle night as a background.  When we got one of these, we had finished supper and were going to sleep.  After looking at the picture it brought back forgotten memories of home and thoughts within ourselves that we may never get to return home.  To thise who had wives and children, it brings thoughts of tgem, and to others, it recalls many memories to their minds.  No matter who he may be, thoughts of wife, children and parents, especially to one  who cannot go home, will arise.

 

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  On the other half of the leaflets was a short script on home-front conditions, and the conversation at of people at home, and thoughts of wives, children parents after going to bed.  Here out in the front lines we get no letters for long periods of time, no news from home, no radio news or newspapers.

  So in my opinion if such things could be considered and utilized, it would carry a great effect.

  In the Signals men set up receiving sets in the trenches and listen to news.  Mainly they listen to news broadcast from Delhi.  They are incredurous of the war news, but music and drama have a great sentimental.  One of the broadcasts dealt with the anti-war sentiments of the noted Japanese statesman NAGANO Seigo.  I think that broadcasting views of leading statesmen who are against the war will have a great effect.

  The most ideal time is to send over your propaganda is when a situation arises of shortage of amunition, arms and rations. It is important to choose the and to send the right type of propaganda.

  In my opinion the effect of Allied propaganda in North Burma up to now has been only 5%.

  (b) M.493, a Sjt. Maj. of H.Q. 114 Inf. Rgmt., was captured at Myitkyina on 7 Aug 1944.

    M.493 reports that while at Myitkyina in June 1944 he saw some dozen different leaflets which had been dropped at various times.  In his opinion the effect of these upon morale of the men was considerable and made them very despondent.  Many would have liked to surrender, but did not get the chance as they were closely watched by their officers.  The officers ordered all leaflets to be handed in or destroyed.

    M.493 had not seen the GUNJIN SHIMBUN prior to capture, but has read it since.  He is of the opinion that this publication dropped in rear area would have more effect on morale than when dropped in the forward areas, as troops in the rear have more time to read and digest its contents.

    In June 1944 while at Myitkyina he saw and read one copy of the “Battlefront News”.   This he considered was very effective on account of its brevity; and he is of opinion that the troops for the most part believed the news it contained.

    M.493 listened to forward Broadcasts when at Myitkyina; they were from a distance of 500 yds.  He considers they had an undermining effect upon Japanese morale, and gave his opinion that the Japanese songs made the men feel home-sick and despondent and the subsequent adress urging them to surrender had a great effect.

  (c) M.170, a L/Cpl of Sigs Unit, Ⅱ Bn. 214 Inf. Rgmt., csptured at Bishenpur in May 1944, gives a completely opposite report to M.493 (para. b.)

    M.170 had seen and read leaflets dropped in the Imphal area in May 1944.  These were treated as a joke, as the men considered them to be merely lying propaganda.  At that time the morale of the men were in his Rgmt. was high, and they paid no attention to the subject matter, merely using the paper for making cigarettes and for other purposes.

    M.170 had listened to Forward Broadcasts about the same time.  He reports that the men enjoyed the music and the songs, but were quite unaffected by the subsequent talk urging them to surrender.

  (d) M.309 a L/Cpl of Ⅲ Bty. 21 Fd. Arty. Rgmt., captured in the Sangshak area in July 1944, gives a similar report.

    M.309 had seen leaflets dropped in the Imphal area during June-July 1944.  At that time he says the morale of 21 Fd. Arty. Rgmt. was high and the troops paid no attention to them whatsoever.

    He had also listened to Forward Broadcasts about the same time, and reports that apart from the songs, which the men enjoyed, the broadcasts had no effect.

 

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