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【工事中】婦人および児童売買禁止に関する国際連盟総会における問題の件 1920. 10. 8

大正九年十月十八日        【鈴木】
  警保局長【印】
  警務課長【印】
  書記官【印】

   婦人および児童売買禁止に関する国際連盟
   総会における問題の件

 本件、別紙外務次官照会に対し、社会局において取りまとめ回答の趣きにつき、公娼廃止問題に関し左記の通り社会局に申し送り然るべきや。

    記

[上余白:□衛生局□に渡し、認め]

 公娼制度の存在は道義上および国家の体面上、極めて望ましからざる<るをもって、相当改善の必要を認む>といへども、現下の国情に徴し、今、にわかにこれを禁止する能はざるをもって、風俗および衛生上、行政官庁の厳重なる監視の下に当分これを存置するのやむを得ざる状態にありとす。<したがって遊廓の新設は、事情やむを得ざる場合のほか、これを許可せざるの方針を採れり。>人身の売買を目的とする行為は、明治五年太政官布告第二百九十五号をもって夙にこれを禁ずる所にして、現行公娼制度は全くこれと異なり、満十八歳以上の婦女にして娼妓たらむとする者は、本人自ら警察官署に出頭し、娼妓となる事由、尊族親等の承諾の事実その他、必要成る事項を具したる書面を提出して申請をなし、警察官署においては厳密慎重の調査を遂げ、その事情においてやむを得ざる者に限り、これを娼妓名簿に登録し、これが稼業を認むるものにして、貸座敷営業者との間に人身の自由を拘束するの契約を認むるものにあらず。故に娼妓にして廃業せむとする場合においては、本人自ら警察官署に出頭し、またその出頭する能はざる場合においては書面等をもって、登録の削除を申請せば、警察官署、直ちに名簿よりこれを削除することとなせり。しかしてこの名簿削除の申請に対しては、何人といへどもこれが妨害をなす能はず、もしこれを妨害するにおいては、内務省令をもって三月以下の懲役または百円以下の罰金に処することとなし、その他、娼妓の通信、面接等の自由を妨害する者に対しても省令中、制裁の規定を設くる所あり。要するに公娼は、わが国現下の状態において<当分>これを認むるのやむを得ざるものにして、そのこれを認むるも、人身の自由を拘束するは断じてこれを容さず、ことに婦女売買の事実は厳にこれを禁ずる所なりとす。

 

写し

通三送苐四四一号
 大正九年九月十一日
     外務次官 埴原正直

内務次官 小橋一太殿

  第一回国際連盟総会における婦人
  および児童売買禁止に関する問題の件

 来たる十一月開催せらるべき第一回国際聯盟総会において婦人および児童の売買禁止に関する問題(同盟および連合国とドイツ国との平和条約第二十三条参照)の議せらるることある合、もしわが国の本件に関する既存条約加入問題、公娼廃止問題または海外より送還せらるる醜業婦の保護問題等が議題とならばわが邦はこれに対しいかなる態度を持すべかこやに関し、あらかじめ貴省の御意見、承知いたしたく候ふ条、右詳細、至急御回答相成りたく、この段、照会に及び候ふなり。

 追って本件既存条約には千八百九十[1890]年のブラッセル条約および同盟および連合国とドイツ国との平和条約第二百八十二条第十七項記載の条約等あるにつき、念のため申し添へ候ふなり。

 

 わが国の妓樓制度は人道上および国家の体面上、極めて望ましからざるは言を俟たざるのみならず、[×妓楼制度の存立は到底、私娼の跋扈を防止する能はず、×]風俗および衞生上、現状に放任するは甚だ不可なるをもって、欧米等に行はるる登録制度等を参照し[×適当の方法を×]<て>調査つつあるむねを説明するの必要ありと認む。

 遊廓は新設を許可せざる方針なることを明らかにする必要ありと認む。

      衛 生 局【印】 【印】 【奥村】 

 

參照)

  同盟および連合国とドイツ国との平和条約

第二十三条 連合国は現行または将来協定せれべき国際条約の規定に遵由し、

(イ)略

(ロ)略

(ハ)婦人および児童の売買ならびに阿片その他の有害薬物の取り引きに関する取り極めの実行につき一般監視を連盟に委託すべし。

第二百八十二条 本条約に別段の規定ある場合を除くのほか、経済上または専門事項上の性質を有する数国間の条約および取り極めは、本条以下数条に列記したるものに限り、ドイツ国と同條約および取り極めの当時国たる同盟および連合国との間に本条約実施の時よりこれを適用す。

(一)より(十六)略

十七 醜業を行はしむるための婦女売買禁止に関する千九百四[1904]年五月十八日および千九百十[1910]年五月四日の条約

 

https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/1012620 1/28 左

大正九年十月十八日        【鈴木】
  警保局長【印】
  警務課長【印】
  書記官【印】

  婦人 及 児童賣買禁止ニ関スル國際聨盟
  縂会ニ於ケル問題ノ件

本件 別紙外務次官照会ニ對シ 社会局ニ於テ取纏 囘答ノ趣ニ付 公娼廢止問題ニ関シ左記ノ通 社会局ニ申送可然哉

   記

 

https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/1012620 2/28

[上余白:□衛生局□ニ渡シ 認メ]

公娼制度ノ存在ハ道義上 及 國家ノ体面上 極メテ望マシカラサル所ナリ<ルヲ以テ相當改善ノ必要ヲ認ム>ト虽 現下ノ國情ニ徴シ 今 俄ニ之ヲ禁止スル能ハサルヲ以テ 風俗 及 衛生上 行政官廳ノ厳重ナル监視ノ下ニ當分 之ヲ存置スルノ已ムヲ得サル狀態ニ在リトス <従テ遊廓ノ新設ハ事情 已ムヲ得サル場合ノ外 之ヲ許可セサルノ方針ヲ採レリ> 人身ノ賣買ヲ目的トスル行為ハ明治五年太政官布告第二百九十五號ヲ以テ夙ニ之ヲ禁スル所ニシテ 現行公娼制度ハ全ク之ト異リ 滿十八歳以上ノ婦女ニシテ娼妓タラムトスル者ハ 本人自ラ警察官署ニ出頭シ  娼妓ト为ル事由、尊族親等の承諾ノ事実其ノ他 必要ナル事項ヲ具シタル書面ヲ提出シテ申請ヲ為シ 警察官署ニ於テハ厳密愼重ノ調査ヲ遂ケ 其ノ

 

https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/1012620 2/28 左

事情ニ於テ已ムヲ得サル者ニ限リ之ヲ娼妓名簿ニ登錄シ之カ稼業ヲ認ムルモノニシテ 貸坐敷營業者トノ間ニ人身ノ自由ヲ拘束スルノ契約ヲ認ムルモノニアラス 故ニ娼妓ニシテ廢業セムトスル場合ニ於テハ本人自ラ警察官署ニ出頭シ 又其ノ出頭スル能ハサル場合ニ於テハ書面等ヲ以テ登錄ノ削除ヲ申請セハ警察官署 直ニ名簿ヨリ之ヲ削除スルコトト為セリ 而シテ此ノ名簿削除ノ申請ニ對シテハ何人ト虽 之カ妨害ヲ為ス能ハス 若シ之ヲ妨害スルニ於テハ内務省令ヲ以テ三月以下ノ懲役又ハ百圓以下ノ罰金ニ處スルコトト為シ 其ノ他 娼妓ノ通信、面接等ノ自由ヲ妨害スル者ニ

 

https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/1012620 3/28 右

對シテモ省令中 制裁ノ規定ヲ設クル所アリ 要スルニ公娼ハ 我國現下ノ狀態ニ於テ<当分>之ヲ認ムルノ已ムヲ得サルモノニシテ 其ノ之ヲ認ムルモ 人身ノ自由ヲ拘束スルハ断シテ之ヲ容サス 殊ニ婦女売買ノ事實ハ厳ニ之ヲ禁スル所ナリトス

 

https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/1012620 3/28 左

通三送苐四四一號
 大正九年九月十一日
     外務次官 埴原正直

内務次官 小橋一太殿

  苐一囬國際聨盟総會ニ於ケル婦人
  及児童賣買禁止ニ関スル問題ノ件

来ル十一月開催セラルヘキ苐一囬國際聨盟総會ニ於テ婦人及児童ノ賣買禁止ニ関スル問題(同盟及聨合國ト独逸國トノ平和條約苐二十三條参照)ノ議セラルルコトアル場合若シ我國ノ本件ニ関スル既存條約加入

 

https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/1012620 5/28 右

問題、公娼廢止問題又ハ海外ヨリ送還セラルル醜業婦ノ保護問題等カ議題トナラハ我邦ハ之ニ對シ如何ナル態度ヲ持スヘキヤニ関シ豫メ貴省ノ御意見承知致度候條右詳細至急御囬答相成度此段及照會候也

追テ本件既存條約ニハ千八百九十年ノ「ブラッセル」條約及同盟及聨合國ト獨逸國トノ平和條約苐二百八十二条㐧十七項記載ノ條約等アルニ付為念申添候也

 

https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/1012620 4/10

我國ノ妓樓制度ハ人道上及國家ノ体面上極メテ望マシカラサルハ言ヲ俟タサルノミナラス [×妓樓制度ノ存立ハ到底私娼ノ跋扈ヲ防止スル能ハス×]風俗及衞生上現状ニ放任スルハ甚タ不可ナルヲ以テ欧米等ニ行ハルヽ登録制度等ヲ参照シ[×適当ノ方法ヲ×]<テ>調査シツヽアル㫖ヲ說明スルノ必要アリト認厶

遊廓ハ新設ヲ許可セサル方針ナルコトヲ 明ニスル必要アリト 認厶

      衞 生 局【印】 【印】 【奥村】 

 

https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/1012620 5/左

(參照)

  同盟 及 聨合國ト独逸國トノ平和條約

苐二十三條 聨盟國ハ現行又ハ将来恊定セラルベキ國際條約ノ規定ニ遵由シ

(イ)畧

(ロ)畧

(ハ)婦人 及 児童ノ賣買 竝 阿片其ノ他ノ有害薬物ノ取引ニ関スル取極ノ実行ニ付 一般监視ヲ聨盟ニ委託スヘシ

苐二百八十二條 本條約ニ別段ノ規定アル場合ヲ除クノ外 經濟上 又ハ專門事項上ノ性質ヲ有スル数國間ノ條約 及 取極ハ本條以下數條ニ列記シ

 

https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/1012620 6/28 右

タルモノニ限リ独逸國ト同條約 及 取極ノ當事國タル同盟 及 聨合國トノ間ニ本條約実施ノ時ヨリ之ヲ適用ス

(一)ヨリ(十六)畧

十七 醜業ヲ行ハシムル為ノ婦女賣買禁止ニ関スル千九百四年五月十八日 及 千九百十年五月四日ノ條約

 

【工事中】警視局書記課編纂 警視類聚規則 坤巻より 第三十五章 売淫取り締まり 1879. 2. 27

警視局書記課編纂

警視 類聚規則 坤巻

   警視局蔵版

 

   第三十五章 売淫取締

    第一款 貸座敷

○(達)九年二月二十四日 第四十七号 区戸長へ

 貸座敷ならびに娼妓規則(第二款に見ゆ)左の通り改定候ふ条、右業体の者どもヘ洩れなく相達し候ふべきこと。

  貸座敷規則

第一条 貸座敷営業は免許地に限るべし。他所においては決して相成らず候ふこと。

第二条 貸座敷をなさんと欲する者、戸長奥印をもつて警視本徐へ願ひ出づべし。詮議の上、免許鑑札下し渡すべきこと。

第三条 黴毒検査査ならびに病院入費として月々商高の一割納金いたすべきこと。

 ただし客帳は毎朝元締めまたは副元締めの検査を受くべきこと。

第四条 明治五年十月仰せ出でられ候ふ年季解放の御趣意(後に出づ)いよいよ堅く相守るべきこと。

第五条 各地同渡世中、元締めならびに副元締めを設け、すべて警視官の命令を奉承し、業体諸取り締まり向きおよび黴毒検査等費金上納方、相取り扱ふべきこと。

第六条 娼妓の価直あらかじめ警視官へ届け出づべきこと。

第七条 娼妓の写真ならびに価付けを店頭へ掲げ出すべきこと。

第八条 娼妓に見世を張らせ、または雇人を路傍、店前等へ出だし置き、通行人へ遊興を勧むる儀、相成らざること(十一年六月三日、丙第三号をもつて改正)。

第九条 娼妓と契約の条件は必ずその条約調印の前、警視官吏の検閲を受くべし。しかしてその契約書には元締めまたは副元締めにて奥印いたすべきこと。

 ただし本文の手続きをなささる契約は、他日、争論を生じ訴へ出で候ふとも取り上ぐまじきこと。

第十条 貸座敷、娼妓規則を娼妓に渡し置き、違背いたさぬ様、厚く注意すべきこと。

 ただし娼妓の規則を了解いたさざる者には篤と教示可事いたすべきこと。

第十一条 娼妓の契約に背き、あるいは命令に従はざるなどのことあるときは、警視官吏に訴へ出で、その処分を受くべし。自儘に苛刻の取り計らひいたすまじきこと。

第十二条 娼妓、他の貸座敷に転移し、あるいは廃業せんことを乞ふときは、そのむね警視官へ届け出づべし。故なく自由を妨げ申すまじきこと。

第十三し 鑑札を持たざる婦女に座敷を貸し、娼妓に紛はしき所業、決していたさすまじきこと。

第十四条 娼妓の健康、清潔に注意し、黴毒の検査を受くべき趣意、篤と告諭あおたすべきこと。

第十五条 娼妓、疾病あらば、何症にかかはらず速やかに警視官吏に届け出で、医員の診察を受くべし。黴毒その他伝染病と認むるときは、別して注意すべきこと。

第十六条 娼妓は猥りに区域外に出すべからず。もしやむを得ざる事故あるときら、必ず慥[たし]かなる者を附け添へ申すべきこと。

 第十七条 娼妓より正業に転就せんと欲するときは、決して故障いたすまじきこと。

第十八条 娼妓をして早く正業に転就せしむるに注意し、従前、物日等の弊習を襲ひ無益の出費を促し候ふ儀、堅く禁止いたすべきこと。

第十九条 罪犯人相書をもつて布達の者は勿論、その他不良の徒、潜伏いたし候ふか、または金銭遣り方等不審の者これある節は、取り逃がさざる様注意いたし置き、速やかにその区警視分署または巡行の巡査へ密告いたすべきこと。

第二十条 この規則に違背いたし候ふ者は、貸座敷免許取り上げ、または取り上げず罰金三拾円以内、苦役六ヶ月以内の処分申し付くべきこと。

◯(参観)明治五年十月二日 布告 第二百九十五号

 人身を売買いたし、終身または年期を限り、その主人の存意に委せ虐使いたし候ふは、人倫に背き、有るまじきことにつき、古来制禁のところ、従来、年季奉公等種々の名目をもつて奉公住みいたさせ、その実、売買同様の所業に至り、もつてのほかのことにつき、自今厳禁なすべきこと。

一、農工商の所業習熟のため弟子奉公いたさせ候ふは勝手に候へども、年限満七年に過ぐべからざること。ただし双方和談をもつて更に期を延ぶるは勝手たるべきこと。

一、平常の奉公人は一ヶ年あてたるべし。もつとも奉公取り続け候ふ者は証文相改むべきこと。

一、娼妓·芸妓等年季奉公人、一切解放いたすべく、右についての貸借訴訟、すべて取り上げず候ふこと。

 右の通り定められ候ふ条、きっと相守るべきこと。

  壬申十月ニ日 太政官

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/1

警視局書記課編纂

警視 類聚規則 坤巻

   警視局藏版

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/285

   第三十五章 賣淫取締

    第一款 貸座敷

○(達)九年二月廿四日第四十七號區戸長ヘ 貸座敷幷娼妓規則(第二款ニ見ユ)左之通改定候條右業體之者共ヘ無洩可相達候事

  貸座敷規則

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/286

第一條 貸座敷營業ハ免許地ニ限ルヘシ他所ニ於テハ決シテ不相成候事

第二條 貸座敷ヲナサント欲スル者戶長奥印ヲ以テ警視本署ヘ願出ツヘシ詮議ノ上免許鑑札可下渡事

第三條 黴毒檢査幷病院入費トシテ月々商高ノ一割納金可致事

 但客帳ハ毎朝元締又ハ副元締ノ檢査ヲ受クヘキ事

第四條 明治五年十月被仰出候年季解放ノ御趣意(後ニ出ツ)彌堅ク可相守事

第五條 各地同渡世中元締幷副元締ヲ設ケ總テ警視官ノ命令ヲ奉承シ業體諸取締向及ヒ黴毒檢査等費金上納方可相取扱事

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/286

第六條 娼妓ノ價直豫メ警視官ヘ可届出事

第七條 娼妓ノ寫眞幷價付ヲ店頭ヘ可揭出事

第八條 娼妓ニ見世ヲ張ラセ又ハ雇人ヲ路傍店前等ヘ出タシ置キ通行人ヘ遊興ヲ勸ムル儀不相成事(十一年六月三日丙第三號ヲ以テ改正)

第九條 娼妓ト契約ノ條件ハ必ス其條約調印ノ前警視官吏ノ檢閲ヲ受クヘシ而シテ其契約書ニハ元締又ハ副元締ニテ奥印可致事

 但本文ノ手續ヲナサヽル契約ハ他日爭論ヲ生シ訴出候トモ取上ケ間敷事

第十條 貸座敷娼妓規則ヲ娼妓ニ渡置キ違背不致樣厚ク可注意事

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/287

 但娼妓ノ規則ヲ了解不致者ニハ篤ト敎示可致事

第十一條 娼妓ノ契約ニ背キ或ハ命令ニ從ハサル等ノ事アルトキハ警視官吏ニ訴出其處分ヲ受クヘシ自儘ニ苛刻ノ取計致間敷事

第十二條 娼妓他ノ貸座敷ニ轉移シ或ハ廢業センヿ[コト]ヲ乞フトキハ其旨警視官ヘ届出ツヘシ無故自由ヲ妨ケ申間敷事

第十三條 鑑札ヲ持タサル婦女ニ坐敷ヲ貸シ娼妓ニ紛ハシキ所業決シテ爲致間敷事

第十四條 娼妓ノ健康淸潔ニ注意シ黴毒ノ檢査ヲ受クヘキ趣意篤ト告諭可致事

第十五條 娼妓疾病アラハ何症ニ拘ハラス速ニ警視官

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/287

 

吏ニ届出醫員ノ診察ヲ受クヘシ黴毒其他傳染病ト認ムルトキハ別シテ注意ス可キ事

第十六條 娼妓ハ猥リニ區域外ニ出スヘカラス若シ已ムヲ得サル事故アルトキハ必ス慥カナル者ヲ附添可申事

第十七條 娼妓ヨリ正業ニ轉就セント欲スルトキハ決シテ故障致間敷事

第十八條 娼妓ヲシテ早ク正業ニ轉就セシムルニ注意シ從前物日等ノ弊習ヲ襲ヒ無益ノ出費ヲ促シ候儀堅ク禁止可致事

第十九條 罪犯人相書ヲ以テ布達ノ者ハ勿論其他不良ノ徒潛伏致候歟又ハ金錢遣方等不審ノ者有之節ハ不

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/288

取逃樣注意致置速ニ其區警分署又ハ巡行ノ巡査ヘ密告可致事

第廿條 此規則ニ違背致候者ハ貸坐敷免許取上又ハ取上ケス罰金三拾圓以内苦役六ケ月以内ノ處分可申付事

◯(參觀)明治五年十月二日布告第二百九十五號

一 人身ヲ賣買致シ終身又ハ年期ヲ限リ其主人ノ存意ニ委セ虐使致シ候ハ人倫ニ背キ有マシキ事ニ付古來制禁ノ處從來年季奉公等種々ノ名目ヲ以テ奉公住爲致其實賣買同様ノ所業ニ至リ以ノ外ノ事ニ付自今可爲嚴禁事

一 農工商之諸業習熟ノ爲メ弟子奉公爲致候ハ勝手

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/288

ニ候得共年限滿七年ニ過ク可カラサル事

 但雙方和談ヲ以テ更ニ期ヲ延ルハ勝手タルヘキ事

一 平常之奉公人ハ一ヶ年宛タルヘシ尤 奉公取續候者ハ證文可相改事

一 娼妓藝妓等年季奉公人一切解放可致右ニ付テノ貸借訴訟總テ不取上候事

右之通被定候條屹度可相守事

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/289

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/289

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/290

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/290

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/291

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/291

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/292

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/292

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/293

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/293

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/294

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/294

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/295

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/295

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/296

 

 

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/791012/296

 

【工事中】文書記録証拠と日本の戦争犯罪の研究 ダキン·ヤン より/序説的小論集 日本の戦争犯罪を研究するにあたって ナチス戦争犯罪および帝国日本政府の記録文書 省庁横断作業部会 2006

2.  Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes: An Interim Assessment

Daqing Yang

 

Revelation and Contention

From Mass Rape to Military “Comfort Women”

The rape of Chinese women by Japanese soldiers has long been identified with Japan’s war atrocities in China.  Reports by American missionaries during the Rape of Nanking in late 1937 provided a glimpse into the extent of sexual violence committed by the Japanese Army.  Numerous other incidents in China and later in Southeast Asia further tarnished the reputation of the Japanese forces.  The postwar trials, however, largely considered rape to be part of a more general violation of law or inhumane treatment, and not a war crime per se.

  Japanese authorities were aware of the problem during the war.  In fact, Japanese records show that orders were issued to deal with the problem and that a small number of Japanese soldiers had been tried by Japan’s own military courts during the war for rape or other crimes against civilians.  In part to reduce local resentment against Japan and in part to prevent the spread of venereal disease among its ranks, the Japanese military contracted private vendors to set up “comfort stations” for the troops as early as 1932.  Again, this practice was known to the Allies but no criminal charges were filed at the trials. There was one exception.  After Japan occupied the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia), the Japanese military forced many young women—including Dutch as well as Eurasian—into providing sexual service to the Japanese.  Those Japanese responsible were punished by the Dutch authorities after the war on account of the abuse of the Dutch women.

  In the 1970s, a few writers in Japan began treating the subject as a crime committed by the Imperial Japanese Army.  It was not until the early 1990s that the case of the military “comfort women” (ianfu) began to attract wide attention, following the first public testimony of a Korean woman who had been forced into military prostitution for the Japanese.  Her account galvanized activists around the “comfort women” issue. Most publications on the subject initially appeared in Korean and Japanese. Numerous works have been also published in English.99 Gathering extensive oral histories, Su Zhiliang, a historian from Shanghai, published the most comprehensive work on this topic in China and set up a Center for the Study of Chinese Comfort Women at his university.  In terms of scope and impact, perhaps no other Japanese war crime has reached the level of international publicity since the 1990s as that of the military “comfort women,” a phenomenon helped by new interest in human rights and standards regarding sexual violence toward women.

  Initially, the Japanese government denied official involvement in the operation.  Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a leading Japanese scholar on Japanese war crimes, made headlines by discovering documents in the Japanese Self-Defense Agency’s library that suggested direct military involvement.  He went on to publish them in a collection of primary documents, which included numerous ATIS reports from NARA.102 Under public pressure, the Japanese government admitted its complicity and set up the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) to compensate former “comfort women” from private sources.  AWF established a History Committee in 1996 to gather and examine relevant documents in archives in Japan, the United States, Holland, and Taiwan.  Historians hired by the AWF also interviewed former “comfort women” in Indonesia and the Philippines.  Their work resulted in a multi-volume collection of documents and a comprehensive bibliography on the subject.  Many are not fully satisfied, however. As Yoshimi points out, numerous Japanese government documents were either lost or remain classified. Among them are police records belonging to the former Home Ministry that allegedly had been destroyed.  Private records, such as the journal of army doctor Aso Tetsuo, contributed much to the understanding of conditions in the comfort stations in China, but many others held by the Self-Defense Agency War History Department Library remained closed to the public for privacy reasons.

  Many issues concerning the “comfort women” are still hotly disputed in Japan.  The number of women victims remains a subject of disagreement; popular accounts frequently give the figure of 200,000.  Takasaki Shōji, an expert on Korean history and chair of the AWF History Committee, emphasized the distinction between the Korean women’s volunteer corps (teishintai), who were sent to work in factories in Japan, and “comfort women.”  As he noted, these two terms had been confused by many Korean activists and had led to an inflated estimate of the number of Korean “comfort women.”  A bigger issue concerns the degrees of coercion and government involvement.  Some also question the veracity of the testimony provided by former “comfort women” as well as their motivation to testify in public.  Hata Ikuhiko, for one, has taken the lead and published many essays as well as a major work on this subject.  Hata essentially equates the “comfort women” system with prostitution and finds similar practices during the war in other countries.  He has been criticized by other Japanese scholars for downplaying the hardship of the “comfort women.”

【工事中】序説 エドワード·ドリー より/序説的小論集 日本の戦争犯罪を研究するにあたって ナチス戦争犯罪および帝国日本政府の記録文書 省庁横断作業部会 2006

Researching Japanese War Crimes Records, Introductory Essays.

Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group. 2006.

1.  Introduction

           Edward Drea

 

“Declassifying U.S. Documents on Japanese War Crimes

Responding to these concerns, on December 6, 2000, Congress passed the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act (Public Law 106-567), which put to rest any doubt that U.S. records relating to Japanese war crimes were included under the aegis of the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (Public Law 105-246).  The implementing directive ordered the Interagency Working Group (IWG) “to locate and disclose, subject to the statute’s exceptions,” any classified U.S. government documents pertaining to
Japanese war crimes and to recommend their declassification and release to the public.  President Clinton appointed IWG members from the major government agencies holding classified records as well as three outside members to represent the public.  The Japanese Imperial Government Records Disclosure Act provided for a fourth public member, but none was appointed.  IWG public members, Thomas H. Baer, Richard Ben-Veniste, and Elizabeth Holtzman, gave willingly of their valuable time.  Their shared characteristic was a determination to make the record available to the American people. It is in large measure thanks to their efforts that the work of the IWG met with cooperation and success. It was due to their persistence that the CIA redoubled its search efforts and released additional information on Japanese war criminals. Special acknowledgment is due to Senators Mike DeWine and Dianne Feinstein and Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, who supported the IWG’s work in Congress and worked with the IWG to elicit the full cooperation of the CIA in the search effort.  The NARA staff members who worked on the Japanese portion of the IWG project under the able direction of David Van Tassel were responsive to authors’ queries, unfailingly provided requested materials, and searched collections meticulously to identify still-classified items.  In particular, without the professional expertise of Senior Archivists William Cunliffe and Richard Myers and their superior working knowledge of the massive collections, the IWG could not have accomplished its goals.  The distinguished IWG Historical Advisory Panel (HAP), chaired by Gerhard Weinberg, always provided sound guidance as the IWG navigated among record groups, constituencies, and politics. Professor Carol Gluck, a member of the HAP, provided insight into Japan’s wartime experience and also suggested the substantive approach of this volume. Steven Garfinkel, chair of the IWG, unfailingly identified sensitive issues during the search period, brought them to the attention of the public members and HAP, and acted to ensure they were expeditiously addressed. Larry Taylor, IWG executive director, skillfully managed the multiple day-to-day administrative responsibilities of the IWG, ensuring it functioned smoothly.

  The government agencies that reviewed their classified record holdings for documents pertinent to Japanese war crimes were the CIA, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the FBI, NARA, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the non-FBI components of the Department of Justice, the U.S. Information Agency, and the National Security Council.

  An estimated 8 million pages of documents were declassified under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, whereas significantly fewer pages—100,000—were released under the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act.  There are many reasons for this discrepancy, most of which fall under two overarching explanations. First, the United States originally confiscated fewer documents pertinent to Japanese war crimes than to Nazi war crimes. Second, by the time the disclosure laws were signed, far fewer World War II Japanese documents than Nazi documents remained classified by U.S. agencies.

Factors Influencing the Number of Documents in U.S. Possession

U.S. government agencies held far fewer records pertaining to Japanese war crimes than to Nazi war crimes.  A major reason is that at war’s end, the Japanese destroyed or concealed important documents, which dramatically reduced the amount of evidence available for confiscation by U.S. authorities.  How could this happen?  At the time the Third Reich surrendered in May 1945, Allied armies occupied almost every inch of Germany.  Document collection teams and specialists were on the scene and already confiscating Nazi records for use in announced war crimes trials.  While the Germans, beginning in 1943, did engage in substantial efforts to obliterate evidence of such crimes as mass murder, and they destroyed a great deal of potentially incriminating records in 1945, a great deal survived, in part because not each one of the multiple copies had been burned.  The situation was different in Japan.  Between the announcement of a ceasefire on August 15, 1945, and the arrival of small advance parties of American troops in Japan on August 28, Japanese military and civil authorities systematically destroyed military, naval, and government archives, much of which was from the period 1942–1945.  Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo dispatched enciphered messages to field commands throughout the Pacific and East Asia ordering units to burn incriminating evidence of war crimes, especially offenses against prisoners of war.  The director of Japan’s Military History Archives of the National Institute for Defense Studies estimated in 2003 that as much as 70 percent of the army’s wartime records were burned or otherwise destroyed.

A report filed by the 27th Marines, 5th Marine Division, on September 24, 1945, documents the systematic destruction of records by the Japanese after the initial surrender to the Allies but before Allied troops arrived. NA, RG 127, entry 1011, box 23, folder: Intelligence–Japanese.

  Nevertheless, some important records survived by chance. Documents discovered in an old safe in the burned-out Navy Ministry turned out to be Imperial Navy planning and policy papers from the 1930s.  The salvaged materials reposed with the Metropolitan Police Agency in Tokyo, which transferred them in 1955 to the cabinet archives.  They remained there until 1968, when the Defense Agency’s National Institute for Defense Studies took control of the collection.

  Japanese authorities also willfully concealed other wartime records.  During the Allied occupation, former Col. Hattori Takushirō, a wartime senior staff officer at Imperial General Headquarters, ordered subordinates to conceal key policy and operational documents from occupation authorities.  Once the occupiers departed, Hattori intended to write a factual history of Japan’s war based on the important concealed materials.  Individuals also hid official documents or personal diaries, some of which came to light only decades later.  For example, in 1989, Kaikōsha, the association of former Imperial Japanese Army officers, published a history of the Nanjing operations together with a two-volume collection of contemporary military documents pertinent to the campaign.  These had not been previously available to the public.  Disturbing excerpts from December 1937 entries in the diary of Lt. Gen. Nakajima Kesago, commander of the 16th Division at Nanjing, were published in a mass circulation monthly magazine in the early 1980s, with permission of the family.  These enormously valuable documents, however, had never been in the possession of U.S. authorities.

  The compartmentalization of the war in Asia also diminished the possibility that one nation would end up with the lion’s share of Japanese documentation. Unlike the German case, there was no one central repository for Asia-specific war crimes documentation.  British Empire forces, for example, took charge of Japanese materials in Southeast Asia.  Returning colonial authorities in Indochina and the Dutch East Indies gathered material for their war crimes trials.  As many as 40,000 U.S. Marines garrisoned transportation centers in north China from October 1945 into 1947 and accepted the surrender of Japanese units, but otherwise there was little U.S. presence in the huge country, and U.S. units collected relatively few Japanese documents from China.  The continuation of the civil war between the central government and the Communists complicated efforts to secure documentation in China.  The Chinese central government confiscated Japanese material in 1945; the victorious Chinese Communists, in turn, seized it from them in 1949.  The Soviet Union also captured important records about Unit 731 and the Japanese Army when it overran Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945.  Sixty years later some of this documentation was still coming to light. In August 2005, for instance, the Chinese publicized detailed research findings based on previously unavailable Unit 731 documents, and in Japan two of Gen.  Ishii’s notebooks with brief entries for August 1945 and January through November 1946 were made public.  Thus, archival material remains fragmented, and while the United States might hold a large amount of Japanese navy or government archival material, many Japanese Army files apparently remained in the possession of other Allied nations or in Japanese hands concealed from the Occupation authorities.

Factors Influencing the Number of Documents Still Classified

Many records relating to the war in Asia were declassified long before the Disclosure Acts were passed, leaving fewer classified records to review.  Because much of the material from the European Theater dealt with the former Soviet Union or its eastern European satellites, it was regarded as useful after the War; records that concerned intelligence sources and methods were considered indispensable during the Cold War.  As a result, an enormous number of these documents remained security classified until the IWG’s review.  The case in the Asia-Pacific Theaters was different.  The United States perceived no immediate threat from the region in 1945.  By the time perceptions changed with the Chinese Communist victory on the mainland in 1949 and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the great bulk of the Japanese records had already been declassified.

  A second reason is that declassification agreements with foreign governments affected the ease with which documents could be opened. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) gathered intelligence in the European Theater, often in cooperation with Allied governments.  Before declassifying these documents, the CIA, as successor to the OSS, had to obtain agreement from the nations that had equities in them.  However, the U.S. military—not the OSS—had control of most of the Asian Theater records.  It created, captured, or confiscated records without the involvement of Allied foreign governments, which enabled the United States to declassify documents unilaterally.  Most of these Japan-related records, including wartime intelligence records, were routinely declassified in the 1970s and 1980s by the Army, Navy, and other Department of Defense entities in the course of their regular review programs.  In short, the United States could declassify and release Japanese records much earlier than it could German records, but the quantity and quality of the Japanese cache was also inferior to the German.

  Furthermore, there were few still-classified postwar records relating to Japanese war criminals because there was not a continuing hunt for Japanese perpetrators as there was for Nazis; therefore, the Army Counterintelligence Corps, CIA, and FBI did not create dossiers on large numbers of Japanese individuals as possible intelligence assets, suspected spies, or prospective immigrants.  This is not to say the U.S. Army did not employ unsavory 
characters in Japan, but for intelligence about the Soviet Union the U.S. government relied less on ex-Imperial Japanese Army officers than it did on former Nazis in Europe.

  Finally, the United States focused on its war against Japan at the expense of other major combat theaters in Asia, especially China.  This emphasis resulted in less scrutiny of Japan’s treatment of fellow Asians and the Imperial Army’s conduct on the Asian mainland.  One might compare the situation to the attention given to the Holocaust, the genocidal campaign against Jews and other “undesirables.”  The enormity of these Nazi crimes stamped an indelible mark on the collective consciousness, yet Americans displayed only vague awareness of the even larger scale of the Nazi barbarities inflicted on the people of the Soviet Union beginning in June 1941.  Both the Chinese and the Soviets dealt with Nazi and Japanese war criminals as they saw fit, and the United States demonstrated little concern about how they did it, unless Washington complained that the tribunals were being used as propaganda forums to embarrass the West for complicity in Axis crimes.
  In sum, the U.S. government acted quickly to declassify Japanese wartime documents in its possession.  By the time the IWG began its work, there were relatively few postwar records related to Japanese war criminals that remained classified.”

 

“Topics of Special Interest 

In addition to adhering to the IWG’s guidelines when conducting their searches for 
classified records pertinent to the Disclosure Acts, agencies also paid particular attention to records that might contain information about Japanese atrocities perpetrated on civilians, such as the Rape of Nanking, “comfort women,” the mistreatment of POWs and civilian internees, medical experimentation on humans, Unit 731, and records related to the U.S. decision not to prosecute Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal. It is important to note, however, that during World War II and its immediate aftermath, not all areas of Japanese war criminality were explored in depth. For example, while the “comfort women” issue is of great current importance, the U.S. government did not systematically collect or create records related to the topic during or after the war.  As a consequence, there are very few documents pertaining to the topic in the archives. The same is true for records related to the Rape of Nanking.

  The atrocities at Nanjing occurred four years before the United States entered the war.  At that time, the U.S. government did not have a large military or diplomatic intelligence network in China. A handful of trained military or embassy personnel reported on events, sometimes second-hand; compared with the sensational press coverage, the official U.S. documentation was scant. As a result, with the exception of the records produced during the postwar Class A war crimes trial of the commanding general of Japanese forces deemed responsible for the Rape of Nanking, there are few materials on this subject at the National Archives

  Immediately after the war, American attention focused on the Japanese responsible for the Pearl Harbor attack, those involved in mistreatment of U.S. prisoners of war, and Japanese military and civilian officials implicated in war crimes, including rape (especially of Filipina women) or forced prostitution of Caucasian women.  There was also knowledge of the Imperial Japanese Army’s field brothel system, as shown in scattered reports declassified during the 1960s.  However, the scope of the brothel network (particularly in China) and the Japanese Army’s official sponsorship of the system were not well understood. Licensed prostitution was legal in prewar Japan, and Allied officials viewed the small part of the overseas system they uncovered as an extension of homeland practices.  Prosecuting Japanese soldiers for rape, a notorious crime everywhere the army set foot, took precedence over investigating the circumstances of “comfort women,” who were seen as professional prostitutes, not as unwilling victims coerced into brothels by employees of the Japanese military.  For instance, a significant document that linked the Japanese government with the military field brothel system, “Amenities in the Japanese Armed Forces,” was translated in November 1945 by ATIS and declassified in the 1960s.  Although available to the public for years, it received little attention until the “comfort 
women” issue focused attention on these wrongdoings in the 1990s.

  As for Unit 731, researchers found no new classified evidence related to Gen. Ishii’s experiments or the unit’s treatment of POWs.  The small amount of newly released material adds more evidence to the already well-documented facts about Japanese abuse of prisoners.  As for the primary question of Unit 731’s alleged experimentation on captured American servicemen, multiple government agencies conducted exhaustive searches in intelligence, military, and diplomatic records but found no definitive evidence.  This was not surprising, because repeated Congressional inquiries about Japan’s alleged use of American prisoners in experiments resulted in extensive examination of U.S. Army and other government agency records in the 1970s, 1980s, and again in early 1990s. In other words, Congressional interest in Japanese war crimes, especially those perpetrated against American POWs, had already opened the existing Unit 731 documents in the possession of the U.S. government and made them available to the public.

  Finally, allegations arose that the U.S. government engaged in a cover-up to conceal incriminating documents pertaining to war crimes in order not to embarrass the Japanese government. Exhaustive searches by several agencies for classified materials, conducted independently of outside political interference of any sort, followed the guidelines imposed by the IWG. They found no evidence to support such assertions. There were miscarriages of justice—Ishii’s case being the most obvious and disturbing—and the question of Emperor Hirohito’s war responsibility remains a source of controversy in the United States and elsewhere. U.S. government archives, however, yielded no new information on these controversial topics. This result may not satisfy those who insist incriminating or embarrassing documents remain hidden, but disinterested parties will appreciate that the IWG has managed to open the remaining classified files pertinent to Japanese war crimes and to make that evidence available to the public. Archival holdings in Japan, China, and the former Soviet Union also offer the possibility of files that may clarify or lead to reinterpretation of our understanding of Japanese atrocities.”

【工事中】東南アジア翻訳·尋問センター 心理戦 尋問公報第二号 1944. 11. 15

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 1/14

   [×CONFIDENTIAL×]

SOUTH-EAST  ASIA
TRANSLATION  AND
INTERROGATION  CENTER

   Psychological  Warfare

   INTERROGATION
   BULLETIN  No 2

    [logo mark]
     S. E. A. T. I. C .

【辭達而已矣】 

           Allender Swift. [Signature]
           Colonel, Inf., U.S. Army,
           Superintendent,
           S. E. A. T. I. C.

   [×CONFIDENTIAL×]

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 2/14

PSYCHOLOGICAL  WARFARE
S. E. A. T. I. C.  INTERROGATION  BULLETIN  No. 2
dated  30  November  1944.

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
  The information contained in this Bulletin is obtained by Interrogation.  The reference numbers shown against each item denote the the informants.  P.W. captured by American or Chinese Forces are indicated by the latter A/- or C/- respectively.  The addition of (Preliminary) to the reference number indicates that the information has been extracted from a Preliminary (Operational) Interrogation Report.

  A record of the original material on which this information is based is kept for reference.  Any enquiries should state the number and paragraph, and should be sent direct to the Officer Commanding, C. S. D. I. C. (I), Red Fort, Delhi.

  Although every effort is made to ensure accuracy, the information in this Bulletin should be treated with reserve until confirmed from other sources.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

       LIST  OF  CONTENTS
Pars.
   1. Effect of Allied Propaganda upon the Japanese Army in Burma.

   2. “Do’s and Don’ts” in Propaganda to the Japanese, a P.W’s essay.

   3. Detailed Criticism upon one issue of the “GUNJIN SHIMBUN” by a P.W.

   4. The notorious Col. MARUYAMA.

   5. Disregard of troop’s welfare by Japanese Officers.

   6. Difficulties due to re-inforcements from different depots.

   7. Average age of re-inforcements to Burma.

   8. A Pacifist in the Japanese Army.

   9. A Japanese Army Brothel in the forward area.

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43

           −2−

1.  EFFECT  OF  ALLIED  PROPAGANDA  UPON  THE  JAPANESE  ARMY  IN  BURMA.

(COMMENT: P.W. Reports upon the effect of Allied propaganda are conflicting.  They differ greatly according to P.W’s personality and own experiences.  If he is of a non-susceptible type, with most of his service in a rear area, and has experienced but little Allied propaganda, he reports the effect as beeing practically nil.  However, the resentment aroused by certain types of propaganda may indicate that some effect has been produced.  If the P.W. has suffered considerable hardships prior to capture, and has been subjected to more extensive propaganda, much of it applicable to his own misfortunes, he reports the effect as being considerable.  These considerations should be borne in mind in evaluating the following P.W. peport.)

  (a) M.555, a Lt. of Ⅲ Bn., 55 Inf. Regt., was captured at Myitkyina on 19 July 1944.

    (ⅰ) Prior to his capture M.555 had read many of the leaflets dropped by Allied planes, and says that day after day planes came over dropping leaflets.  He reports that for the most part these had very littie effect on the men’s morale.  M.555 dose not in general consider these leaflets as being well produced, he thinks their composition is mediocre and the general subject matter not of a nature likely to appeal to the mind of the average Japanese O.R. (Ref. his essay below.)

    M.555 had listened frequently to the Japanese broadcasts from Delhi, in fact it was a common practice amongst the officers of his unit.  Listening to the Delhi was strictly forbidden, but they all did it secretly on the ordinary field W/T sets, either Type 3 or Type 5, as they had no private receiving sets of their own.  The news as put out from Delhi was regarded as bring so much propaganda, and only half of it taken as being anywhere near the truth.  M.555 said they always recognised the Delhi Broadcasts because of the announcer’s obviuosly foreign accent.

    M.555 has listened to Forward Broadcasts , the last occasion being just before his capture at Myitkyina.  He says that Forward Broadcasts have a strong effect on the morale of Japanese troops providing that those to whom the broadcasts are made are “up against it”.

    (ⅱ)  Essay written by M.555 whilst under Interrogation at C. S. D. I. C. (I) giving his iwn views upon Allied propaganda.  (Translation; original retained at C. S. D. I. C. (l).).

  “EFFECT  OF  ALLIED  PROPAGANDA  ON  THE  JAPANESE  ARMY.

  “During the five years of my army career I have been indoctrinated against enemy propaganda as a soldier, at the officers’ school and as an Officer.  The object of this teaching is to prepare us against all types of enemy  propaganda, so as to let nothing stand in the way, to to believe in the Army (Command), to perform our utmost for the Empire.

  The principles above-mentioned are clearly stated in the manuals “General Instructions regarding the Confuct of Infantry in Battle” and “Combat regulation” and also in the Mandate on “Soldiers’ Morale”.

  Therefore in order to make effective propaganda, articles against “BUSHIDO” should be avoided, since the Japanese Army is too well indoctrinated agsinst (such) propaganda and with the Army spirit.  A carefull study if the (charcter of the) Japanese people as a whole should be made, and articles which deal with this should have a better effect when sent at the right moment, both in time and un situation.

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 4/14

           −3−

  I will quote a few examples Allied propaganda used against us during the North Burma campaign since last January and their effect.

  The statements I make represent my straight-forward opinion, and in no way am I holding anything back just because I am a P.W. and receiving good treatment from you.

  In the Hukawng Valley one Bn. attacked an enemy pisition for two days without success, and we withdrew to regroup for another attack.  On the night before we were to make this attack, we had just finished supper and were about to get some sleep when a plane flew overhead and dropped some propaganda leaflets.  These leaflets told of the situation in the South East Pacific, and the troops were greatly surprised to get news of such a character, but the one thing which spoiled its effect was the last part which contained uncomplimentary remarks about the Emperor and the Imperial Household.  Officers and men were very much hurt by these, although the article on the S.W.Pacific was very good and appreciated.  It aroused great resentment and morale became very high.  Consequently when we attacked the position again on the third day, we succeeded in capturing it.

  So by just a few lines saying the wrong thing, propaganda intended to lower morale will instead back-fire on the Allies.

Propaganda concerning Surrender:

  From ancient times there has been no instance where a Japanese soldier has voluntarily surrendered.  (Edit. Comment: C. S. D. I. C. (I) have a number of instance to the contrary.)  The reason for this is that throughout the whole of Japan the Japanese Spirit is pounded deeo into the heart of each and every Japanese from the time he or she is born, in other wors BUSHIDO.  Also in the Imperial Rescript, Field Manuals, and other documents, it us specifically stated that it is grave dishonor and disgrace to become the P.W.  To be captured and to give out military information is disgraceful, but it is an honor to commit suicide in order to “save one’s face”.  So therefore in any circumstances anyone with the true Imperial spirit and ideal will never give himself up to be taken as a P.W.

  On two or three occasions leaflets stating that if we would wave the leaflets above our heads and give ourselves up, the Allies would treat us well and no harm woul befall us.  I was in hospital at the time one of these leaflets was dropped; a soldier brought one in and we all had big laugh over it.  Since in the Japanese Army there is a great shortage of paper we make use of them in more ways in one.

  From your point of view it is just a waste of money and paper to drop such propaganda.  The leaflets are sent back to our Intelligence Department so as to gather information on the Allies.  The Intelligence people check the quality of the paper, ink, and the type of literature, etc., and can get some knowledge of your economic situation.  And if the leaflets were not carefully prepared, they may give the Japanese much needed information.

Burma night and Short Scripts.

  In one of the propaganda leaflets there was a sentry stating with the jungle night as a background.  When we got one of these, we had finished supper and were going to sleep.  After looking at the picture it brought back forgotten memories of home and thoughts within ourselves that we may never get to return home.  To thise who had wives and children, it brings thoughts of tgem, and to others, it recalls many memories to their minds.  No matter who he may be, thoughts of wife, children and parents, especially to one  who cannot go home, will arise.

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 5/14

           -4-

  On the other half of the leaflets was a short script on home-front conditions, and the conversation at of people at home, and thoughts of wives, children parents after going to bed.  Here out in the front lines we get no letters for long periods of time, no news from home, no radio news or newspapers.

  So in my opinion if such things could be considered and utilized, it would carry a great effect.

  In the Signals men set up receiving sets in the trenches and listen to news.  Mainly they listen to news broadcast from Delhi.  They are incredurous of the war news, but music and drama have a great sentimental.  One of the broadcasts dealt with the anti-war sentiments of the noted Japanese statesman NAGANO Seigo.  I think that broadcasting views of leading statesmen who are against the war will have a great effect.

  The most ideal time is to send over your propaganda is when a situation arises of shortage of amunition, arms and rations. It is important to choose the and to send the right type of propaganda.

  In my opinion the effect of Allied propaganda in North Burma up to now has been only 5%.

  (b) M.493, a Sjt. Maj. of H.Q. 114 Inf. Rgmt., was captured at Myitkyina on 7 Aug 1944.

    M.493 reports that while at Myitkyina in June 1944 he saw some dozen different leaflets which had been dropped at various times.  In his opinion the effect of these upon morale of the men was considerable and made them very despondent.  Many would have liked to surrender, but did not get the chance as they were closely watched by their officers.  The officers ordered all leaflets to be handed in or destroyed.

    M.493 had not seen the GUNJIN SHIMBUN prior to capture, but has read it since.  He is of the opinion that this publication dropped in rear area would have more effect on morale than when dropped in the forward areas, as troops in the rear have more time to read and digest its contents.

    In June 1944 while at Myitkyina he saw and read one copy of the “Battlefront News”.   This he considered was very effective on account of its brevity; and he is of opinion that the troops for the most part believed the news it contained.

    M.493 listened to forward Broadcasts when at Myitkyina; they were from a distance of 500 yds.  He considers they had an undermining effect upon Japanese morale, and gave his opinion that the Japanese songs made the men feel home-sick and despondent and the subsequent adress urging them to surrender had a great effect.

  (c) M.170, a L/Cpl of Sigs Unit, Ⅱ Bn. 214 Inf. Rgmt., csptured at Bishenpur in May 1944, gives a completely opposite report to M.493 (para. b.)

    M.170 had seen and read leaflets dropped in the Imphal area in May 1944.  These were treated as a joke, as the men considered them to be merely lying propaganda.  At that time the morale of the men were in his Rgmt. was high, and they paid no attention to the subject matter, merely using the paper for making cigarettes and for other purposes.

    M.170 had listened to Forward Broadcasts about the same time.  He reports that the men enjoyed the music and the songs, but were quite unaffected by the subsequent talk urging them to surrender.

  (d) M.309 a L/Cpl of Ⅲ Bty. 21 Fd. Arty. Rgmt., captured in the Sangshak area in July 1944, gives a similar report.

    M.309 had seen leaflets dropped in the Imphal area during June-July 1944.  At that time he says the morale of 21 Fd. Arty. Rgmt. was high and the troops paid no attention to them whatsoever.

    He had also listened to Forward Broadcasts about the same time, and reports that apart from the songs, which the men enjoyed, the broadcasts had no effect.

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 6/14

 

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 7/14

 

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 8/14

 

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 9/14

 

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 10/14

 

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 11/14

 

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 12/14

 

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 13/14

 

 

https://archives.seoul.go.kr/item/43 14/14

 

東学党に関する特別報告 釜山 中路兵站監 古川宣 1894. 9. 30

自明治二十七年六月
至同    年十月

二十七、八年戦役  戦況 及 情報

          陸軍省

 

                   二百六

東学党に関する特別報告

          二十七年九月三十日 於釜山

             中路兵站監 古川宣誉

一、工兵第六大隊苐一中隊の一部、東学党と戦ひたることは、すでにその概略を電報にて上申せしが、その詳報を蒐集すれば左のごとし。

 工兵少尉後藤馬次郎、部下の下士兵卒二十五名、日本人夫十二名を率ひ[→ゐ]龍宮より聞慶に進む途中(さきに竹内騎兵大尉遭難の節、取り敢へず島嶺近傍にありし野戦工兵にも命を下し赴援せしめたれども、その後、該工兵は仁川に集合を命じたるため、引き上ぐる途中なりしならん)、九月二十八日午前九時頃、セキモン(二十万分の一の図中、地名なし。聞慶より五里東方に当たる)にて東学党に出会し開戦せり。敵はその数六百、すこぶる要害に拠り堅固に防御するにも関せず、左右に斥候を出し、中央の凹道を進み、三百米突[メートル]のところより放火[=発砲]したり。敵もさかんに放火せしが、つひに兵器を棄てて四方に散飛し行衞知れず、多分醴泉および蘇野(聞慶の東北およそ二里の葛平より四里に当たる)の方に逃れしもののごとし。わが兵死傷者なく敵は死者二人を遺棄すり。この者、立派なる陣羽織を着し居れり。多分頭分にて、この者死にたるため破[=敗]れたるならんといふ。そのほか負傷者は多数の様子なれども、一人も残し置かず、ただ道路上、血痕多きをもってこれを知れり。彼の陣処に充てたる家屋十一軒は、みな焼き払ひたり。分捕り品は火縄筒百八、三挺刀四振り、鎗三本、馬二頭、鮮銭九貫文余り。その他多数の兵器を取り上げしも、人夫不足のため六駄分ほど聞慶に持ち来たり、その他は途中に棄て置きたるため、聞に司令部より直□に下士および人夫二十名を遣り、これを収集に着手せりとの報あり。また龍宮付近にて血痕斑々たる地図を後藤少尉拾ひ得たりといふ。竹内大尉所持せしものなるべし。なほ逃亡の賊は他の兵をもって追踵攻擊を命じたり。

二、九月二十九日、大邱より憲兵一名を変装せしめ、通辨を付し、探偵として出したるに、大邱の東三里の地にて韓人およそ三十名に襲はれ、石を投じつつ二里ばかりを追跡され、辛ふじて逃れ帰れり。よって直ちに三宅歩兵大尉、守備兵十名を率ひ[→ゐ]出張し、暴徒三名、村吏一名を捕縛し帰り、大邱において目下糺問中なり。

三、慶尚道安東の事大党に関しては前便報告の通里にこれあり。そね他全羅道各処の東学党は旧八月二十七日(わが九月二十六日)南原において大公論を開くにつき集会すべきむね檄を四方に発し、すでに集会するもの数万人あり。おのおの兵器を持し処々に横行して党外者の財産を強奪するにつき、行路は危険にして、ほとんど旅人の通行なき有り様に至れりといふ。全羅道雲峰(慶全両道の境)の営将は兵器を要処に派して専ら守衛んなし、東学党慶尚道ヘ入り来たらざる様防塞し居れりといふ。慶尚道晋州は前日、その管下に東学党蜂起したるも、牧使、兵使の曉諭にて鎮息せりといふ。慶尚道宜寧にても民乱起こり、官長を追ひ出し、属吏の家を焼きたり。慶尚道機張にても旧八月二十七日(わが九月二十六日)より各村人民、党を起こし、党外者の家八九戸を焼いたり。各村人民これに畏れて悉く集合することとなり、旧九月一日(わが九月二十九日)官庁に押し懸け訴ふるところありといふ。

四、前項はすべて探偵上得たるところにして、韓人のいふところ尽く信を措くに足らずといへども、処在民乱蜂起し不穏の景況を呈したるは疑ふべからず、よって各司令部には、尽く警戒を加へ、危険の点には兵を増し、予備弾薬を送り、四方を偵察捜索せしめ、わが兵站路の安全を謀ることに汲々たり。しかるになほ電線の破断、跡を絶たず慙憤恐悚の至りなり。これがため昼夜となく厳密の巡回取り締まりを命じ、怪むべき者は直ちに擊殺せしめんとす。すでに一昨日、洛東において電柱を仆したる韓人一名、斬殺掲示せしめたり。

 右、報告す。

 

https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/image-j/C06060021700 1/2

自明治二十七年六月
至仝    年十月

二十七、八年戰役戰况及情報

          陸軍省

 

https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/image-j/C06060042900 1/4

 

                   二百六

東學黨ニ関スル特別報告 廿七年九月三十日於釜山

             中路兵站監 古川宣譽

一 工兵苐六大隊苐一中隊ノ一部東學黨ト戰タルヿ[コト]ハ已ニ其概略ヲ電報ニテ上申セシガ其詳報ヲ蒐集スレハ左ノ如シ

工兵少尉後藤馬次郎部下ノ下士兵卒廿五名日本人夫十二名ヲ率ヒ龍宮ヨリ聞慶ニ進ム途中(曩ニ竹内騎兵大尉遭難ノ節不取敢島嶺近傍ニ在リシ野戰工兵ニモ命ヲ下シ赴援セシメタレトモ其後該工兵ハ仁川ニ集合ヲ命シタル为メ引上ル途中ナリシナラン)九月廿八日午前九時頃「セキモン」(廿万分ノ一ノ圖中地名ナシ聞慶ヨリ五里東方ニ當ル)ニテ東學党ニ出會シ開戰セリ敵ハ其数六百頗ル要害ニ拠リ堅固ニ防禦スルニモ関セス左右ニ斥候ヲ出シ中央ノ凹道ヲ進ミ三百米突ノ処ヨリ放

 

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火シタリ敵モ熾ンニ放火セシカ遂ニ兵器ヲ棄テテ四方ニ散飛シ行衞知レス多分醴泉及ヒ蘇野(聞慶ノ東北凢二里ノ葛平ヨリ四里北ニ當ル)ノ方ニ逃レシモノヽ如シ我兵死傷者ナク敵ハ死者二人ヲ遺棄セリ此者立派ナル陣羽織ヲ着シ居レリ多分頭分ニテ此者死タル为メ破レタルナラント云フ其外負傷者ハ多数ノ樣子ナレトモ一人モ残シ置カズ只道路上血痕多キヲ以テ之ヲ知レリ彼ノ陣処ニ充タル家屋十一軒ハ皆焼拂ヒタリ分捕品ハ火縄筒百八三挺刀四振鎗三本馬二頭鮮銭九貫分余其他多数ノ兵器ヲ取上シモ人夫不足ノ为メ六駄分程聞慶ニ持來リ其他ハ途中ニ棄テ置キタル为メ聞慶司令部ヨリ直□ニ下士及人夫廿名ヲ遣リ之ヲ收集ニ着手セリトノ報アリ又龍宮附近ニテ血痕斑々タル地圖ヲ後藤少尉拾ヒ得タリト云フ竹内大尉所持セシモノナルヘシ尚逃亡ノ賊ハ他ノ兵ヲ以テ追踵攻

 

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擊ヲ命シタリ

二 九月廿九日大邱ヨリ憲兵一名ヲ変装セシメ通辨ヲ附シ探偵トシテ出シタルニ大邱ノ東三里ノ地ニテ韓人凡三拾名ニ襲ハレ石ヲ投シツツ二里許ヲ追跡サレ辛フシテ逃レ帰レリ依テ直チニ三宅歩兵大尉守備兵十名ヲ率ヒ出張シ暴徒三名村吏一名ヲ捕縛シ帰リ大邱ニ於テ目下糺問中ナリ

慶尚道安東ノ亊大黨ニ關シテハ前便報告ノ通リニ有之其他全羅道各処ノ東學黨ハ旧八月二十七日(我九月廿六日)南原ニ於テ大公論ヲ開クニツキ集會ス可キ㫖檄ヲ四方ニ発シ既ニ集會スルモノ数萬人アリ各兵器ヲ持シ処々ニ横行シテ党外者ノ財産ヲ強奪スルニ付行路ハ危險ニシテ殆ント旅人ノ通行ナキ有様ニ至レリト云フ全羅道雲峯(慶全両道ノ境)ノ営將ハ兵ヲ要処ニ派シテ專ラ守衛ヲ為シ東学黨ノ慶尚道ヘ入リ来ラサル様防塞シ居レリト云フ

 

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慶尚道晋州ハ前日其管下ニ東学黨蜂起シタルモ牧使兵使ノ曉諭ニテ鎭息セリト云フ慶尚道冝寧ニテモ民乱起リ官長ヲ追出シ属吏ノ家ヲ焼キタリ慶尚道機張ニテモ旧八月廿七日(我九月廿六日)ヨリ各村人民黨ヲ起シ党外者ノ家八九戸ヲ焼タリ各村人民之ニ畏レテ悉ク集合スルヿ[コト]トナリ旧九月一日(我九月廿九日)官廳ニ押懸ケ訴フル処アリト云フ

四 前項ハ都テ探偵上得タル処ニシテ韓人ノ云フ処尽ク信ヲ措クニ足ラスト虽モ処在民乱蜂起シ不穏ノ景况ヲ呈シタルハ疑フヘカラス依テ各司令部ニハ尽ク警戒ヲ加ヘ危險ノ点ニハ兵ヲ増シ豫備彈藥ヲ送リ四方ヲ偵察搜索セシメ我兵站路ノ安全ヲ謀ルヿ[コト]ニ汲々タリ然ルニ尚電線ノ破断跡ヲ絶タス慙憤恐悚ノ至リナリ之カ為メ昼夜トナク厳密ノ巡囬取締ヲ命シ怪ムヘキ者ハ直チニ擊殺セシメントス已ニ一昨日洛東ニ於テ電柱ヲ仆シタル韓人一名斬殺掲示セシメタリ

右報告ス

 

↑9月30日 中路兵站監 古川宣誉 東学党に関する特別報告 https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/meta/C06060042900 JACAR(アジア歴史資料センター)Ref.C06060042900、陸軍省大日記/日清戦役/日清戦役/雑/明治27年 「秘27、8年戦役戦況及情報」(防衛省防衛研究所 陸軍省-日清戦役雑-M27-3-104)

【工事中】東学党余聞 従明治27年 6月至明治27年10月 秘密 日清朝事件 諸情報綴 一 より 1894. 9. 23

https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/image-j/C06060131000

従明治廿七年六月
至同    十月

清朝事件
 諸[×報告×]<状報>綴 一

秘密 陸軍省

 

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    東學党餘聞

本月二日竜山ヲ發シ廣州 利川 竹山 鎮川 清州 䓁ヲ経テ九日全州ニ着シ東學党ノ首領ヲ以テ世ニ聞エタル金鳳均ヲ全羅监營ニ訪フテ翌日晩金ノ使人ニ導カレ布政局ノ後房ニ於テ面會シ三時間余ノ筆谈ヲナス
金鳳均一名ヲ全明淑ト云フ余面會ノトキハ金ヲ称ス蓋シ金ハ實姓ニシテ全ハ偽姓ナランカ

余ハ房ニ入リ筆ヲ執リ姓名ヲ通シ或友人ヨリ曽テ其人物ト豊富ヲ聽キ渇仰丿念ニ禁エス今囬京城ヨリ来リ

 

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訪ヒシ旨ヲ告ゲ次テ余ノ素志ト東洋ノ現势、朝鮮ノ實状、真正倫理ノ主義、真正經濟ノ主義ヲ述ヘテ以テ今日ニ䖏スル方法手段ヲ論シ金ノ教示ヲ乞フ金モ亦再三辞スレトモ聴カス乃チ余ノ渡韓以来感スル所ヲ挙ケテ之ヲ语ル禁ノ答フル所大抵左ノ如シ

我等唯〻閔家ノ一族ガ要路ニ在リテ威権ヲ弄シ私福ヲ擅ニスルヲ見テ慷慨ニ勝エス爾来同志ヲ糾合シテ之ヲ斥ケント欲シ屡〻政府ニ臻リテ之ヲ诉エシモ一切採用セラレス是レ閔家内ニ在リテ我䓁ノ訴願ヲ杜塞シ殿下ニ達セシメサルモノト思惟シ

 

 

東学党余聞 https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/meta/C06060138000 JACAR(アジア歴史資料センター)Ref.C06060138000、従明治27年6月至明治27年10月 「秘密 日清朝事件 諸情報綴1」(防衛省防衛研究所 陸軍省-日清戦役雑-M27-7-108)