Nazi War Crimes & Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group
Final Report to the United States Congress
April 2007
ナチ戦争犯罪と日本帝国政府文書記録の省庁横断作業集団
合衆国議会への最終報告書（2007 年 4 月）
“In a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of thinking people not to be on the side of the executioners.”
「紛争の世界、生贄と死刑執行人たちの世界にあっては、死刑執行人の側に立たないことが考える者の仕事だ｡」
〜アルベール·カミュ
IWG Membership
Allen Weinstein, Archivist of the United States, Chair
Thomas H. Baer, Public Member
Richard Ben-Veniste, Public Member
Elizabeth Holtzman, Public Member
Historian of the Department of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Security Council
Director of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
Preface 前書き
As acting chair of the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG) for more than five years, and from the perspective of someone who spent more than 30 years inside the Federal Government promoting the declassification of records of permanent historical value— frequently without a positive outcome—I can vouch that the IWG has been tremendously successful.
ナチスの戦争犯罪と日本帝国政府記録に関する省庁横断作業集団 (ＩＷＧ) の議長代行を五年以上にわたって務めてきて、また連邦政府内で恒久の歴史的価値を有する記録の機密解除を推進することに――肯定的な成果が得られないことも度々あったが――三十年以上を費やしてきた者の立場から見て、私はＩＷＧは絶大な成功を収めたことを保障できる。
The IWG leaves two legacies. First, the IWG has ensured that the public finally has access to the entirety of the operational files of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), totaling 1.2 million pages; over 114,200 pages of CIA materials; over 435,000 pages from FBI files; 20,000 pages from Army Counterintelligence Corps files; and over 7 million additional pages of records. Historians, political scientists, journalists, novelists, students, and other researchers will use the records the IWG has brought to light for many decades to come.
As researchers pore over this extraordinary collection of important and interesting documents, will they rewrite the history of World War II, the Holocaust, or the Cold War? Probably not. But as the IWG historians have already shown in U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, the details of major and lesser-known events will now be far richer, and as nuances of these events comes to light, historians will reinterpret and revise our previously accepted narratives.
The IWG’s second legacy may ultimately be more important than its first: it has demonstrated that disaster does not befall America when intelligence agencies declassify old intelligence operations records. Before the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (NWCDA), intelligence agencies, supported by the President, the Congress, and the Federal courts, routinely and consistently exempted files containing intelligence sources and methods from declassification, regardless of the age or actual sensitivity of the information.
One of the intelligence methods that remained protected is the fact that U.S. intelligence agencies have relationships with the intelligence agencies of allied or even non-allied nations. That intelligence agencies may cooperate across national borders is so obvious and well documented that merely stating it sounds sophomoric. However, U.S. intelligence agencies have routinely and consistently denied access to records that disclosed such a relationship, claiming that revealing such relationships will threaten or damage our ability to cooperate with foreign governments in the future.
The NWCDA pointedly disavowed such categorical exemptions, insisting instead that continued classification is justified only with evidence that the release of particular information would harm our national security today. This principle resulted in the release of a vast quantity of records. For example, for at least a quarter of a century, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) had sought to persuade the CIA to declassify and send to NARA the operational files of the OSS, which has been defunct since 1945. Over the years, the CIA delayed declassifying these records, largely on the grounds that disclosing these records could harm our intelligence relationship with foreign governments. The OSS records indeed reveal the vast interrelationship between British intelligence and the OSS: they contains tens of thousands of pages of intelligence first gathered by the British and shared with us, and the records document the disagreements that are inevitable in such a close relationship. Nevertheless, it is preposterous to suggest that releasing OSS records under the NWCDA is a threat to our current working relationship with the United Kingdom. All OSS records could have been safely released decades ago.1
1. Although the vast bulk of OSS records had already been released by the CIA to the National Archives, under the Disclosure Acts, it released 1.2 million pages of its most sensitive records, making virtually all OSS records available for researchers.
In this second legacy lies the balance of the IWG’s work. Having worked in this arena for many years, I see as clearly as anyone does the significance of the single individual to the declassification process. Whether a request for declassification is answered with a yes or a no is essentially determined by whoever happens to make the disclosure or non-disclosure decisions. All of the laws and orders and regulations, all of the classification and declassification guides and guidance can be cited to support either answer this person cares to give. The individual in charge makes the call based on his or her experiences, biases, proclivities, knowledge, or ignorance, and for many years thereafter, all of us may be stuck with it.
For that reason, I hope that those individuals who sit in decision-making positions in the CIA, FBI, NSA, the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, or elsewhere recognize through the example of the IWG that government secrets, even intelligence secrets, are finite. To that end, I hope that those individuals recognize and take credit for the extraordinary contribution both to history and public accountability that their agencies have made through their work with the IWG. They have enhanced the public’s knowledge without jeopardizing the national security of the United States or the ability of U.S. agencies to perform their important functions on behalf of our national security.
Let me be clear. The declassification lessons learned during the implementation of the Disclosure Acts can and should be applied to other intelligence records of similar age, and may even be applied to records of somewhat more recent vintage, no matter how sensitive the information within these records once was.
Whatever our successes, any enterprise as ambitious and untested as the one undertaken by the IWG is certain to have its disappointments. Among the disappointed will be those who had hoped for a voluminous release of U.S. records relating to Japanese war crimes. My understanding of the depth of feeling surrounding this issue changed dramatically in 2001, when I spoke to a meeting of the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II in Asia. The Global Alliance is a federation of organizations and individuals from many different countries who share a single goal: to tell the world about the horrors that took place in Asia in conjunction with the occupation forces of the Japanese Imperial Government. Until my conversations during that meeting with many committed individuals from the United States, Canada, China, Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and elsewhere, I did not fully appreciate the concern of millions of survivors and their families, friends, and associates that this story is virtually untold. Many people around the world had hoped that the IWG would unearth records that would help them document Japanese atrocities.
我々がいかに成功したにせよ、ＩＷＧが引き受けた様な野心的な未曾有の企ては、ある程度は失望をも呼ぶものである。失望する人たちの中には日本の戦争犯罪に関係する合衆国の文書記録の大量放出を期待していた人たちもいるだろう。この件を取り巻く感情の深刻さについての私の理解は2001年に劇的に変化した。それは第二次大戦の歴史を保存する全地球同盟[世界抗日戦争史実維護連合会]の会合で話をした時のことである。全地球同盟は、日本帝国政府の軍隊による占領に伴ってアジアに生じた惨禍を世界に語り広めるという、ただ一つの目的を共有する様々な国の数多くの組織や個人の連合体である。その会合で合衆国、カナダ、中国、韓国、フィリピン日本その他の諸国の熱心な個人たちと対話するまで、この話が事実上まだ語られていないのではないかという、何百万もの体験者やその家族、関係者の懸念を、私は十分に感じ取っていなかった。ＩＷＧは日本の暴虐の裏付けとなる文書記録を発掘するだろうと、世界各地で多くの人々が期待していた。
To these people, I state unequivocally that the IWG was diligent and thorough in its search for relevant records about war crimes in Asia. The IWG uncovered and released few Asian theatre records because few such U.S. records remained classified. Unclassified records were not under IWG jurisdiction. To address any concerns that may arise relating to the dearth of documents released under the JIGDA, we refer readers to publications that document the capture, exploitation, and return of Japanese records from World War II.2
こうした人たちに対して私は、ＩＷＧが関係書類を探索するに当たって精力的かつ徹底的であったことを、はっきりと申し述べたい。ＩＷＧが暴露し公表したアジア戦域の文書記録がわずかしかなかったのは、そうした文書で機密指定のものかわずかしか残されていなかったからである。機密解除済みの記録はＩＷＧの管轄外なのだ。ＪＩＧＤＡ[日本帝国政府情報開示法]を適用して公表された記録文書の不足に関して生じかねない懸念に対して、我々は第二次世界大戦中の日本の文書記録の押収と利用、返還に関する記録文書を跡付けた出版物に読者の参照を促したい。
2. See, for example, Greg Bradsher, World War II Japanese Records: History of their Capture, Exploitation, and Disposition (forthcoming).
２．例えば、グレッグ·ブラッドシャーの『第二次世界大戦期日本の文書記録、その押収と利用、配置』(近刊）を見よ。
NARA archivists attest that the real problem with Japanese documents from World War II is not that they are few in number, but that they are largely underused by researchers. To encourage the full review of these records, the IWG published Researching Japanese War Crimes: Introductory Essays.3 With this volume, we hope to expose the interested public to the breadth of previously declassified or unclassif ied records within the National Archives that bear on these subjects and that remain to be fully exploited by scholars, journalists, and other researchers. Further, Researching Japanese War Crimes outlines the current level and nature of English and Japanese language scholarship that pertains to the subject of Japanese Imperial Government war crimes. Finally, it discusses the reasons why the volume and specificity of records about Asian war crimes is much smaller than records of Nazi war crimes. The book is accompanied by a searchable CD-ROM of a 1,700-page finding aid to these NARA records, as well as a smaller finding aid to select Japanese War Crimes records. We are confident that records exist that will present in time a very clear picture of the scope and horrors of war crimes in Asia before and during World War II. We very much hope that Researching Japanese War Crimes will spur the research and scholarship necessary to achieve this end.
3. Edward Drea, et al., Researching Japanese War Crimes: Introductory Essays (Washington, DC: GPO) 2006.
* * *
The IWG leaves a vast product and several important legacies. These came about only because of our extreme good fortune in bringing together the talent, hard work, and commitment of so many individuals, many of whose names are not even specifically revealed in these pages. Each of those mentioned or unmentioned was a sine qua non to the accomplishments of the IWG.
First, we must recognize the extraordinary personal and professional contribution and commitment of Senator Mike DeWine and Member of Congress Carolyn Maloney. They were our congressional champions from day one and throughout our entire existence. They and their most competent and committed staff members were always there for the IWG. On behalf of the American people, we thank you.
“The declassification lessons learned during the implementation of the Disclosure Acts can and should be applied to other intelligence records of similar age, and may even be applied to records of somewhat more recent vintage, no matter how sensitive the information within these records once was.”
What can I say about our three public members, Elizabeth Holtzman, Tom Baer, and Richard BenVeniste? Their commitment, their refusal to relent, their forthrightness are unlike anything I have ever experienced elsewhere. I can only hope that in their continuing pursuits they take a moment to step back and take pleasure in the fruits of their labor. Unlike IWG government members, who implemented the acts as an additional part of their regular duties, the three public members selflessly devoted hour upon hour of their lives to understanding the nuances of these particular laws and striving to get each agency to implement the law fully. They consulted with various experts to obtain the information necessary to assist the agencies in implementing the laws, and lobbied the Hill to extend the life of the IWG so that agencies had every opportunity to comply with the Disclosure Acts. Their unwillingness to settle for anything less than our best effort shows a rare and inspiring leadership, and their tenacity is the reason IWG can claim its success.
None of the IWG’s accomplishments would have been realized without the unwavering commitment within the government itself to a fundamental belief in the public’s right to know shown by the government members of the IWG. This began with the leadership of the IWG’s first chair, Michael Kurtz of the National Archives and Records Administration. By the time I came to the IWG, Dr. Kurtz had already assured through his devotion and hard work that the IWG would be successful. Dr. Kurtz and then-United States Archivist John Carlin extended their generosity throughout the life of the IWG. Archivist of the United States Allen Weinstein stepped in at a critical time and through his exemplary management ushered the IWG to its successful conclusion.
NARA’s contributions to the success of the declassification effort are too numerous to name in detail. It must suffice to say that NARA devoted an inordinate amount of financial, human, and intellectual resources to the declassification effort. David Van Tassel, William Cunliffe, and the other IWG staff at NARA put their archival, records-management, and history expertise to work, and the American people have been vastly better served because of it. Among their myriad other duties, NARA staff makes the millions of pages of documents declassified by the IWG accessible to the public, and their work in this regard will continue long after other members of the IWG have turned their attention elsewhere.
The independent historians employed by the IWG, Richard Breitman, Norman Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, and Daqing Yang, became ex officio members of the IWG, and their contributions pervade every aspect of our work. Their volume, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, published by the IWG, brilliantly exploits and exposes the records declassified and disclosed in the IWG’s work and adds greatly to our public exposure.
The IWG’s work and publications benefited immeasurably from the input of the IWG’s Historical Advisory Panel, chaired by the extraordinary and irrepressible Gerhard Weinberg, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. The expertise in World War II history of these historians and authors, their experience with the records under and related to the IWG’s jurisdiction, and their understanding of the agencies that hold these records made them invaluable to the IWG’s declassification effort.
Eli M. Rosenbaum and his top aides at the Department of Justice/Office of Special Investigations also served the IWG far beyond their official responsibilities. OSI contributed resources, information, and ideas that became essential to agency declassification efforts.
As competing responsibilities at times overwhelmed my schedule, IWG Executive Director Larry Taylor became my alter ego. With so much talent and commitment invested in the IWG, Larry and I were simply the traffic cops. Larry’s intelligence, patience, cool-headedness, steadfastness, and ability to work well with all types of personalities served this role perfectly and speaks volumes about the training and experience he received during his prior career in the Foreign Service. I am most indebted to him. Kris Rusch brilliantly edited and managed the publication of the two IWG historical volumes and this report. Her forbearance with the demands of so many contributors is truly amazing. She was a great addition to our resources.
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) expertly managed the contract that supported the historians and numerous other contractors.
Finally, I ask the reader to turn to appendices 1 and 4 for the names of some of the others who enabled the IWG to successfully implement the largest congressionally mandated declassification effort in history. I am immensely proud of the record we have achieved, and I thank most sincerely those who worked in the spotlight and those who worked behind the scenes to make it possible.
Steven Garfinkel
Acting Chair,
January 2001–September 2006
Washington, April 2007
