CONVERSION OF JAPANESE AIR FORCES TO KAMIKAZE FORCES
日本の航空戦力の神風特攻戦力への転換
By the summer of 1944, it had become evident to the Japanese air commanders that there was no way in which they could equal the United States air arms at any point. 1944 年の夏までには、いかにしてもあらゆる点で合衆国の航空兵器と肩を並べられないことが、日本軍の航空司令官たちには明らかになっていた。Their losses were catastrophic, while the results which they were achieving were negligible. 彼らの損失は破局的であった反面、彼らが達成しつつある結果は取るに足らないものだった。The one and only asset which they still possessed was the willingness of their pilots to meet certain death. 彼らが所有する唯一の資産は、確実な死をも恐れない日本の操縦士たちの心意気だった。Under these circumstances, they developed the Kamikaze technique. この様な事情により、日本軍は神風戦法を開発した。A pilot who was prepared to fly his plane directly into a ship would require but little skill to hit his target, provided he got through the intervening screen of enemy fighters and antiaircraft fire. 自分の飛行機で直接敵艦に突っ込む覚悟さえあれば、操縦士が標的に飛行機をぶち当てるのにはほとんど技能を要しないだろう。立ちはだかる敵戦闘機と対空砲火の衝立を突破できたとしての話だが。If sufficient Japanese planes attacked simultaneously, it would be impossible to prevent a cerrain proportion from getting through. 十分な数の日本軍の飛行機が同時に攻撃して来れば、ある程度の割合が突破するのを防ぐことは不可能だ。Even though losses would be 100 percent of the planes and pilots thus committed, results, instead of being negligible, might be sufficient to cause damage beyond that which we would be willing to endure. これに参加する飛行機と操縦士の 100 ％ が失わるとしても、その結果は、取るに足らないどころか、我々が甘受するだろう程度を超える損害をもたらすに充分だろう。
From October, 1944, to the end of the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese flew 2,550 Kamikaze missions, of which 475, or 18.6 percent were effective in securing hits or damaging near misses. 1944 年 10 年から沖縄戦集結までに日本軍は 2,550 の神風特攻機を飛ばし、そのうち 475 機、18.6 % が有効に命中を遂げるか、わずかにそれたが損害を与えた。Warships of all types were damaged, including 12 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, and 16 light and escort carriers. 12 隻の航空母艦、15 隻の戦艦と 16 隻の軽空母または護衛空母を含む、あらゆる類型の軍艦が損害を受けた。However, no ship larger than an escort carrier was sunk. しかしながら護衛空母より大型の艦船で沈没したものはなかった。Approximately 45 vessels were sunk, the bulk of which were destroyers. 約 45 隻の船が沈没したが、その大半は駆逐艦だった。The Japanese were misled by their own inflated claims of heavy ships sunk, and ignored the advice of their technicians that a heavier explosive head was required to sink large ships. 日本軍は大艦撃沈という自分自身の誇張した主張に惑わされ、大型艦船を沈めるにはより重い弾頭が必要だという自軍技術者の忠告を無視した。To the United States the losses actually sustained were serious, and caused great concern. 合衆国には実際の持続的な損失は深刻であり、大きな懸念を呼び起こした。Two thousand B-29 sorties were diverted from direct attacks on Japanese cities and industries to striking Kamikaze air fields in Kyushu. 二千回の B-29 の出撃が日本の都市や工業施設の直接攻撃から九州にある神風特攻隊の飛行場を叩くことに転用された。Had the Japanese been able to sustain an attack of greater power and concentration they might have been able to cause us to withdraw or to revise our strategic plans. もし日本軍がより強力で集中的な攻撃を持続できていたならば、結果として私たちに戦略計画を撤回させるか見直させことができたことだろう。
At the time of surrender, the Japanese had more than 9,000 planes in the home islands available for Kamikaze attack, and more than 5,000 had already been specially fitted for suicide attack to resist our planned invasion. 降伏時、日本軍は神風攻撃に使える飛行機を本土の島々に 9,000 機以上保有し、5,000 機以上がすでに自爆攻撃の装備を施されていた。
↑UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
SUMMARY REPORT
(Pacific War)
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1 JULY 1946 https://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#cojaftkf
